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I. INTRODUCTION
A. In General
In March 1994, The American Law Institute published its
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommenda-
tions ("AL Corporate Governance Project" or "Project").' This
Project encompasses numerous aspects of corporate law affecting
the general management of "substantial enterprises,"2 including
the functions and powers of directors and officers; the duty of
care; the business judgment rule; the duty of fair dealing; de-
fensive tactics in tender offers; and remedies, such as derivative
actions and appraisal proceedings.
This article examines the provisions of this Project that have
an impact on various forms of mergers and acquisitions, which
for this purpose include all forms of business combinations,
tender offers, freezeouts and sales of controlling stock interests.
Thus, the mergers and acquisitions addressed here encompass
I AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1994) [hereinafter ALI CORPORATE GOVER-
NANCE PROJECT]. See generally Symposium on Corporate Governance, 48 BUS.
LAW. 1267-1483 (1993); Symposium: the American Law Institute's Principles of
Corporate Governance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 871-1293 (1993). See also Roswell
B. Perkins, The ALI Corporate Governance Project in Midstream, 41 BUS. LAW.
1195 (1986); Roswell B. Perkins, The Geneses and Goals of the ALI Corporate
Governance Project, 8. CARDOZO L. REv. 661 (1987).
2 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, at ix.
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transactions that the Project refers to as "transaction[s] in con-
trol," and all other forms of acquisitions addressed in the Pro-
ject. The concept of a "transaction in control is explored in
Section III.B.
The Project sets out different governance rules for the follow-
ing types of mergers and acquisitions:
(1) Transactions in control, other than management
buyouts (hereinafter arm's length mergers and acquisi-
tions);
(2) Management buyouts;
(3) Defensive tactics in tender offers;
(4) Sale of controlling stock interests; and
(5) Freezeouts.
B. Use of the Time-Warner Transaction
Each of the merger and acquisition governance rules in the
Project either would have applied in Time, Inc.'s 1989 acquisi-
tion of Warner Communications, Inc. or can be illustrated by
reference to that acquisition. Therefore, this article uses the
facts of the Time-Warner transaction to illustrate the operation
of these governance rules and to compare the effect of these
rules to the results that actually applied in the Time-Warner
transaction under Delaware law. Also, relevant developments in
Delaware law since Time-Warner are examined, including the
Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Cinerama, Inc. v. Techni-
color, Inc.,' Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network,
Inc.4 and Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc.5
The Time-Warner acquisition involved three basic transac-
tions. First, Time and Warner entered into a merger agreement
pursuant to which Time was to acquire Warner in exchange for
stock of Time. The transaction included a lock-up stock option
agreement pursuant to which Time and Warner had options to
purchase a block of each other's stock in the event the merger
was not completed. The purpose of this stock option agreement
was to discourage other firms from attempting to acquire either
Time or Warner.
3 1995 WL 431434 (Del. 1995).
4 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
5 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994).
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This merger transaction would be a transaction in control
under the Project and would be subject to the Project's gover-
nance rules for arm's length mergers and similar transactions.
Because of the structure of the Time-Warner transaction, it
would appear that the Project's management buyout provisions
could also have been implicated in the merger. Apparently, the
drafters of the Project did not contemplate this effect.
The original structure of the merger was abandoned by Time
after Paramount made an unwanted tender offer for Time.
Time responded by restructuring the merger with Warner into
a tender offer by Time for Warner. Thus, the second phase of
the Time-Warner transaction involved a tender offer by
Paramount for Time and a responding tender offer by Time for
Warner.
Paramount, not wanting to acquire both Time and Warner,
amended its tender offer and conditioned the closing on, inter
alia, the termination of Time's tender offer for Warner and the
redemption or invalidation of Time's poison pill. Thus, Time's
action implicates the Project's governance rules on defensive
tactics in tender offers. These rules can be compared with the
Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Paramount Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Time, Inc. (Time-Warner)6 which dealt explicitly
with Time's defensive actions. The court found Time's actions to
be consistent with the requirements of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co.,' which applies an enhanced business judgment
rule to directors' defensive actions. This standard requires di-
rectors to establish that they had reasonable grounds for believ-
ing that there was a danger to corporate policy and effective-
ness and that the defensive actions taken were reasonable in
relation to the threat posed. As a result of the Time-Warner
decision, Paramount abandoned its tender offer for Time, and
Time completed its tender offer for approximately 60% of the
stock of Warner.
Although Time's tender offer for Warner was not preceded by
a purchase by Time of a controlling stock interest in Warner,
such a transaction sometimes precedes a tender offer. If Time
had made such a purchase, the provisions of the Project dealing
with sales of controlling stock interests would have been appli-
cable. Thus, a slight hypothetical modification of this part of
6 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
7 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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the Time-Warner transaction can be used to illustrate the Proj-
ect's governance rules regarding sales of controlling stock inter-
ests.
The third aspect of the Time-Warner transaction involved a
freezeout merger which occurred after the completion of Time's
tender offer for Warner. This freezeout involved a reverse sub-
sidiary merger, pursuant to which Time acquired the remaining
40% of Warner shares held by the public. The freezeout provi-
sions of the Project would apply to this type of transaction.
Thus, the three steps in the Time-Warner transaction (i.e.,
the originally structured arm's length merger; the tender offer
by Paramount for Time and Time's responding tender offer for
Warner; and the second step freezeout merger) can be used to
illustrate the application of each of the merger and acquisition
provisions of the ALI Corporate Governance Project and to com-
pare the results under the Project to those that arose under
Delaware law.
C. Structure of Article
This article proceeds as follows:
1. Duty of Care and Business Judgment Rule
The first topic considered here is the duty of care of directors
and officers and the related business judgment rule.8 These
concepts, which are fundamental to corporate governance and
are applicable in many of the specific rules of the Project gov-
erning mergers and acquisitions, are addressed in Section 4.01
of the Project. Thus, Section 4.01 sets out the general rules
governing the management of the corporation by the directors
and officers. These principles generally apply when a target
corporation engages in a transaction in control. They also apply
to the directors and officers of an acquiring corporation.
2. Arm's Length Mergers and Acquisitions
The second topic addressed herein is the role of the directors
and shareholders with respect to transactions in control, other
8 See infra Part II.
No. 2:145]
than management buyouts, proposed to a corporation.' This
topic is addressed in Section 6.01 of the Project. Also, the relat-
ed rules regarding appraisals are considered.
Section 6.01 encompasses all forms of consensual mergers
and acquisitions in which the stock or assets of an independent
target corporation are being acquired by an acquiring corpora-
tion in an arm's length transaction. Section 6.01(a) provides
that the duty of care and business judgment rule set forth in
Section 4.01 apply to the actions of directors in transactions
governed by Section 6.01. Section 6.01(b) governs the voting
rights of the shareholders of the parties to a transaction in
control.
In a transaction in control governed by Section 6.01 of the
Project, Section 7.21 provides that the target corporation's
shareholders have appraisal rights. These rights give a share-
holder who votes against a transaction the right to elect to
have the value of his or her shares determined by an appraisal
court. In such case, in lieu of receiving the consideration speci-
fied in the merger or acquisition, the electing shareholder re-
ceives a cash payment for the shares in the amount of the
value determined by the appraisal court.
Also, the acquiring corporation's shareholders have this ap-
praisal right unless they own at least 60% of the stock of the
acquiring corporation after the transaction. Thus, in the garden
variety arm's length merger or acquisition in which a large
acquiring corporation acquires the stock or assets of a small
target, only the shareholders of the target have appraisal
rights. Such appraisal rights are not granted, however, in a
sale of substantial assets of the target that leaves it without a
significant continuing business if such sale is for cash or cash
equivalents and the target makes liquidating distributions with-
in one year of the sale.' °
Section 7.24 provides that if certain conditions are met, an
appraisal proceeding is the shareholder's exclusive remedy for
challenging a transaction under Section 6.01.
Section III.G of this article looks at the impact of Delaware
law and the Project's governance rules in the originally pro-
posed Time-Warner merger transaction.
9 See infra Part I.
10 2 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 7.21(c)(2).
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3. Management Buyouts
The third provision of the Project examined here is Section
5.15, which governs a transfer of control in which a director or
senior executive officer of the target is interested." Thus, this
type of transaction encompasses management buyouts in which
the management of the target ends up with a significant equity
position in the surviving corporation after the change in control
of the target. Transactions under Section 5.15 may give rise to
appraisal rights under Section 7.21; however, appraisal is not
the exclusive remedy as is provided in Section 7.24 for arm's
length mergers and acquisitions.
Section IV.C considers the potential impact of Section 5.15 on
the originally proposed Time-Warner merger.
4. Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers
The fourth topic considered is Section 6.02 of the Project,
which deals with actions of a target's directors that have the
foreseeable effect of blocking an unsolicited tender offer.'
Thus, this provision governs the actions of the target's directors
in attempting to defend against a hostile tender offer. The
appraisal remedy is not involved here.
Section V.J examines the impact of Section 6.02 and Dela-
ware law on the defensive actions taken by Time's directors.
5. Sale of Controlling Stock Interests
The fifth topic considered here is the disposition by the con-
trolling shareholder of its shares to a third party. 3 Section
5.16 of the Project addresses this issue. No appraisal rights
attach in these transactions.
Section VI.B examines the impact of Section 5.16 and Dela-
ware law on a hypothetical pre-merger sale of a controlling
stock interest in the Time-Warner transaction.
1' See infra Part IV.
1 See infra Part V.
13 See infra Part VI.
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6. Freezeout Transactions
The sixth topic considered here is a freezeout transaction, in
which a controlling shareholder forces the minority shareholders
to sell their shares, with the controlling shareholder becoming
the sole shareholder.'4 The Project divides freezeouts into two
types of transactions.
First, those transactions in which the controlling shareholder
does not have sufficient voting power to unilaterally effectuate
the freezeout. These transactions are referred to here as "non-
majority control freezeouts."
Second, those transactions in which the controlling share-
holder possesses sufficient voting power to unilaterally effect-
uate the transaction, as is the case with short form mergers.
These transactions are referred to here as "majority control
freezeouts."
Both types of freezeouts, are governed by Section 5.10. In
majority control freezeouts, if the conditions of Section 7.25 are
satisfied, appraisal is the exclusive remedy; however, appraisal
is not the exclusive remedy in a non-majority control freezeout.
Section VII.D examines the treatment of Time's freezeout of
Warner under Delaware law and the Project's Governance rules.
7. Summary of Structure
In summary, the aspects of the ALI Corporate Governance
Project examined here are:
(1) The basic rules in Section 4.01 regarding the duty of care
and the business judgment rule;15
(2) The rules in Section 6.01 governing the role of directors
and shareholders in arm's length mergers and acquisitions and
the related rules regarding appraisal proceedings; 5
(3) The rules of Section 5.15 governing management buyouts
and the related rules regarding appraisal proceedings; 7
14 See infra Part VII.
15 See infra Part II.
16 See infra Part III.
17 See infra Part IV.
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(4) The rules of Section 6.02 governing the action of a tar-
get's directors that have the foreseeable effect of blocking an
unsolicited tender offer;
8
(5) The rules of Section 5.16 regarding the sale of shares in
the target by a controlling shareholder;" and
(6) The rules of Section 5.10 regarding both non-majority
control and majority control freezeout transactions and the
related rules regarding appraisal proceedings, including the
exclusivity rules of Section 7.24 for majority control freeze-
outs.
20
I. DUTY OF CARE AND BusInESS JUDGMENT RULE
A. Introduction
The duty of care and the related business judgment rule are
set forth in Section 4.01 of the Project. These concepts apply
generally to the conduct of the board of directors and are also
applicable in various merger and acquisition contexts. For that
reason these concepts are addressed here.
Section 4.01(a) sets out the basic duty of care obligation of
directors and officers, and Section 4.01(c) specifies the assoc-
iated business judgment rule. Section 4.01(b), which authorizes
delegation of functions to committees of the board or to direc-
tors, officers, employees or other persons, is not examined here.
Section 4.01(d) provides that the person challenging a director
or officer under Section 4.01 has the burden of proof.
In explaining the purpose of the business judgment rule, the
AL Corporate Governance Project says:
The basic policy underpinning of the business judgment rule is
that corporate law should encourage, and afford broad protection
to, informed business judgments (whether subsequent events
prove the judgments right or wrong) in order to stimulate risk
taking, innovation and other creative entrepreneurial activ-
ities.2'
'8 See infra Part V.
'9 See infra Part VI.
20 See infra Part VII.
21 1 ALI CORPORATE GOvERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, introductory note,
at 135.
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The Project goes on to explain that because of expectations of
greater profits, shareholders "accept the risk that an informed
business decision - honestly undertaken and rationally
believed to be in the best interests of the corporation - may
not be vindicated by subsequent success."2 The Project further
says that the protection provided by the business judgment rule
is also "based on a desire to limit litigation and judicial intru-
siveness with respect to private sector business decision-
making."
23
The breach of the duty of care will subject the director to
liability only if it is shown that acts or omissions resulting in
the breach were the legal cause of damage to the corpor-
ation.'
The Project explains the difference between the duty of care
and the duty of loyalty, which the Project refers to as the duty
of fair dealing. The duty of loyalty requires that the director
not use her corporate position to make a personal profit or to
otherwise gain a personal advantage. On the other hand, the
duty of care requires that the director act carefully in monitor-
ing and directing the management of the corporation. 6
B. Duty of Care
Under Section 4.01(a), a director or officer has a duty to
perform his or her functions "[1] in good faith, [21 in a manner
that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interest of
the corporation, and [3] with the care that an ordinarily pru-
dent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like
position and under similar circumstances." 2 This duty of care
includes the "obligation to make, or cause to be made, an in-
quiry when, but only when, the circumstances would alert a
reasonable director or officer to the need therefor."8 The ex-
tent of the inquiry shall be consistent with what the director or
officer "reasonably believes to be necessary."2 9 The Project
22 id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 136 and § 4.01(d).
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points out that the inquiry obligation in Section 4.01(a)(1) is a
"fundamental part of the duty of care obligations established in
the first paragraph of § 4.01(a),"3 ° and the purpose of Section
4.01(a)(1) is merely to provide "clarity and emphasis."3 '
In performing any of his or her functions, including over-
sight, a director or officer may rely on materials and persons in
accordance with Sections 4.02 and 4.03.2
This duty of care is subject to the business judgment rule,
which is set out in Section 4.01(c).3"
The Project explains that the duty of care standard contained
in Section 4.01(a) is consistent with the articulation of such
standard in most jurisdictions and that the standard could be
implemented entirely by judicial decision.'
The Project points out that the use of the terms "good faith,"
"reasonably believes," and "like position" in Section 4.01(a),
"recognize that in determining whether reasonable care has
been exercised, the special skills, background, or expertise of a
director or officer are properly accorded weight."35
The Project also points out that during this century, directors
or officers have been found to have violated the duty of care
obligations in only about 40 appellate opinions.36 Most of these
involved egregious facts, such as "sustained patterns of inatten-
tion to obligations" or "unreasonable blindness to problems that
later [caused] substantial harm."'
C. Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule, which is set out in Section
4.01(c), provides that a director or officer who makes a business
judgment in "good faith" fulfills the duty under Section 4.01 if
the director or officer:
30 Id. § 4.01(a)(1)-(a)(2) cmt. a, at 162.
31 Id.
2 Id. § 4.01(a)(2).
33 Id. § 4.01(a).
- Id. § 4.01 cmts. a, b, at 140-41.
's Id. § 4.01(a) cmt. f.
" Id. § 4.01(a) cmt. h, at 155.
" Id. See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A-2d 814 (N.J. 1981)
(holding passive and inattentive director liable for violation of duty of care).
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(1) is not interested [§ 1.23] in the subject of the business
judgment [that is, is not a party to the transaction and has no
business, financial or familial type interest in the transaction];
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business
judgment to the extent the director or officer reasonably believes
to be appropriate under the circumstances; and
(3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the
best interests of the corporation. s
Section 4.01(d) provides that the person challenging the con-
duct of a director or officer under Section 4.01 has the burden
of proving a breach of the duty of care, including the inapplica-
bility of the provisions of Section 4.01(b), relating to delegation,
and Section 4.01(c), relating to the business judgment rule.
Thus, the burden of proving that the business judgment rule is
not applicable is on the challenging party.
Section 4.01(d) also provides that in a damage action, the
challenging party has the "burden of proving that the breach
was the legal cause of damage suffered by the corporation."39
As discussed in Section II.E, Delaware law does not follow the
approach taken in.Section 4.01(d).40
If the challenging party meets the burden of showing that
the business judgment rule is inapplicable, for example, by
showing that the director was interested, or acted in bad faith
or was not informed, then the "burden shifts to the director to
prove that the transaction was fair and reasonable to the cor-
poration."4 ' The business judgment rule has often been stated
in Delaware case law as a "presumption" that a director or
officer has acted properly.42 The word "presumption" is not
used in Section 4.01(d) because it is "imprecise and subject to
misinterpretation."4 The effect should, however, be the same
as Delaware's presumption because both the burden of coming
forward with evidence and the burden of persuading the trier of
fact is on those challenging a business judgment.4
8 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJEcT, supra note 1, § 4.01(c) (empha-
sis added).
39 Id. § 4.01(d).
o Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
41 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJEcT, supra note 1, at 177 (quoting
Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980)).





The following chart compares the elements of the duty of
care rule of Section 4.01(a) with the elements of the business
judgment rule of Section 4.01(c):
DUTY OF CARE § 4.01(a)
Duty of Care is Satisfied if
Director or Officer:
[1] Performs functions in good
faith;
[2] Performs in a manner he or
she [reasonably believes] to be
in the best interests of the
corporation;
[3] Performs with the care that
an ordinarily prudent person
would reasonably be expected
to exercise in a like position
under similar circumstances;
[4] Makes inquiry when, but
only when, the circumstances
would alert a reasonable direc-





Business Judgment Rule is
Satisfied if Director or Officer:
[1] Makes a business judgment
in good faith;
[2] [Rationally] believes that
the business judgment is in
the best interests of the corpo-
ration;
[3] Not applicable;
[4] Is informed with respect to
the subject of the business
judgment to the extent the
director or officer reasonably
believes to be appropriate un-
der the circumstances;
[5] Is not interested in the
subject of the business judg-
ment.
There are four salient differences between the duty of care
and the business judgment rule.
First, the business judgment rule applies only where there is
a conscious decision, whereas the duty of care encompasses an
ongoing duty of oversight and stewardship irrespective of
decision-making.
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Second, the business judgment rule is available only for
disinterested transactions, whereas the duty of care obligation
applies to both interested and disinterested transactions. How-
ever, if the director is interested in the transaction, the conduct
or transaction will be tested under Part V of the Project, which
deals with the duty of fair dealing.
Third, to satisfy the duty of care, the performance by the
director must be in a manner the director "reasonably believes"
is in the best interest of the corporation, whereas, under the
business judgment rule, the director must have a "rational
belief' that the business judgment is in the best interest of the
corporation. The "rational belief' standard is less difficult to
satisfy than the "reasonably believes" standard. As pointed out
by Professor Goldschmid, one of the draftsmen of the Project:
This [rational belief] standard is intended to provide directors
and officers with a wide ambit of discretion. Although the words
have close etymological ties, a sharp distinction is drawn in
§ 4.01 between the words "reasonable" and "rational." The phrase
"rationally believes" is intended to permit a significantly wider
range of discretion than the term "reasonable," and to give a
director or an officer a safe harbor from liability for business
judgments that might arguably fall outside the term "reasonably"
but are not so removed from the realm of reason when made
that liability should be incurred.'
This rational belief standard is explored further below.
Fourth, to satisfy the duty of care, the director's performance
must meet the standard of care that an ordinarily prudent
person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like posi-
tion under similar circumstances; however, there is no such
explicit element in the business judgment rule. In effect, this
care element is presumed to be satisfied if the business judg-
ment rule is satisfied. Thus, the standard of conduct set forth
in the duty of care has a higher threshold than the standard of
review set forth in the business judgment rule.
The Project points out that there are no statutory formula-
tions of the business judgment rule; the rule has been devel-
' Harvey J. Goldschmid, Outline on the Duty of Care and the Business
Judgment Rule, in ALI-ABA, ALI'S PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 47
(Oct. 6-7, 1994).
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oped in the case law.' The formulation of the rule in Section
4.01(c) is thought to be consistent with the formulation of the
rule under present law in most jurisdictions." The Project ex-
plains that the business judgment rule offers a safe harbor for
an informed business decision that the officer or director ratio-
nally believes is in the best interests of the corporation.'
As noted above, the rule only protects affirmative business
judgments, including decisions not to act; cases involving omis-
sions are to be judged under the reasonable care standard of
Section 4.01(a).49 In support of this proposition the Project con-
tains the following quote from the Delaware Supreme Court's
decision in Aronson v. Lewis:5° "[T]he business judgment rule
operates only in the context of director action. . . . [I]t has no
role where directors have either abdicated their functions, or
absent a conscious decision, failed to act."5'
The Project points out that "[iut is well settled that good faith
and disinterested decision-making are prerequisites to entry
into the business judgment rule's safe harbor."52 Further, if
the challenging party can establish the inapplicability of the
business judgment rule, then the burden shifts to the director
to establish that the due care standard was met.53
The Project points out that the requirement in Section
4.01(c)(2) of informed decision making "focuses on the prepared-
ness of a director or officer in making a business decision as
opposed to the quality of the decision itself."' The Project fur-
ther points out that the "reasonably believes" standard, set
forth in Section 4.01(c)(2), for determining the level of inquiry
has "both an objective and a subjective content."5" This re-
quirement should be "interpreted realistically and with an ap-
preciation of the factual context in which the business judgment
1 ALI CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE PROJEcT, supra note 1, at 173.
47 Id. § 4.01(c) cmt. a, at 173.
4 Id.
49 Id. § 4.01(c) cmt. c, at 174-75.
'0 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984).
51 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJEcT, supra note 1, § 4.01(c) cmt. c,
at 175.
52 Id. cmt. d, at 176.
5 Id. at 176-77.
4 Id. cmt. e, at 177.
5 Id. at 178.
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was made.""6 Thus, the time that is realistically available is
taken into account in determining whether a proper inquiry has
been made.
With respect to the law in Delaware on this issue, the Pro-
ject quotes Smith v. Van Gorkom57 as follows: "the directors
were duty bound to make reasonable inquiry.""8 Further, the
Project says that the Van Gorkom decision requires directors to
inform "themselves 'prior to making a business decision, of all
material information reasonably available to them
The Project goes on to point out, however, that Van Gorkom
applies a "gross negligence' test in determining whether a busi-
ness judgment was 'an informed one."6
The requirement, set forth in Section 4.01(c)(3), that the
director "rationally believe" that the decision is in the best
interests of the corporation also has both an objective and a
subjective content.6 ' To satisfy this requirement the "director
or officer must actually believe that the business judgment is in
the best interests of the corporation and that belief must be
rational."
6 2
The Project says that this "rationally believes" standard is
consistent with a line of Delaware cases, including Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co.,6' where the court said that it would not
disturb a business judgment if "any rational business purpose
can be attributed" to the director's decision; Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co.," where the court adopted an "any
rational business purpose" test; and Sinclair Oil Corp. v.
Levien,6" where the court adopted a "rational business pur-
pose" test.66 The Project also cites by comparison In re RJR
Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,67 where the court said:
56 Id.
57 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
58 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJEcT, supra note 1, § 4.01(c) cmt. f,
at 179.
59 Id. cmt. e, at 177.
6Id.
61 Id. cmt. f, at 179.
m2Id.
63 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir. 1981).
6493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
65 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
61 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 4.01(c) cmt. f,
at 179.
"In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, No. Civ. A. 10389, 1989
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"As I conceptualize the matter, such limited subjective review
as the rule contemplates (i.e., is the judgment under review
'egregious' or 'irrational' or 'so beyond reason,' etc.) really is a
way of inferring bad faith.""8
D. Illustration of Application of the Business Judgment Rule
to an Acquiring Corporation
The reasonably informed and the rational belief tests are
illustrated by an example in which the board of directors of a
potential acquiring corporation (white knight) decides on short
notice to make a tender offer for a target corporation that was
already the subject of a tender offer. Another corporation had
made a tender offer for the target at $48 per share, and two
days before the closing of that tender offer, at the urging of the
directors of the target and upon the advice of the officers of the
white knight, the white knight made a competing tender offer
at $49 per share. The offer was made even though the officers
of the white knight did not have adequate time to evaluate the
target's research and development operations and several other
significant aspects of its business. The decision to make the
tender offer was made on the basis of an evaluation and discus-
sion of all available information even though the information
was imperfect.
In the example, the decision to make the tender offer is
protected by the business judgment rule. This is so because
pursuant to the requirement of Section 4.01(c)(2) the "directors
acted reasonably in believing that they were informed to the
extent appropriate under the circumstances[,]"69 and pursuant
to the requirement of Section 4.01 (c)(3), the directors "rational-
ly believe[d] that their business judgment [was] in the best
interest of the corporation." ° The example also shows that a
decision by the directors not to make the acquisition would also
be protected by the business judgment rule.
WL 7036 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989), appeal refused by, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. Ch.
1989).
1 ALI CoRPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 4.01(c) cmt. f,
at 179.
69 Id. at 182.
70 Id. § 4.01(c)(3), at 139.
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E. Observations
The above example of the actions taken by an acquiring
corporation illustrates that it will, indeed, be a rare situation in
which the business judgment rule will not protect the directors
of an acquiring corporation in deciding to make, or not to
make, an acquisition of a target. Indeed, there appear to be no
cases in which the directors of an acquiring corporation have
been denied protection under the business judgment rule. As
illustrated in Smith v. Van Gorkom, this is not the case with
the directors of target corporations.
In Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor II),"' the
Delaware Supreme Court did not follow the approach of Section
4.01(d) of the Project, which provides that in a damages action,
the challenging party has the "burden of proving that the
breach was the legal cause of damages suffered by the corpora-
tion."2 In that case, MacAndrews & Forbes Group Incorporat-
ed (MAF) acquired Technicolor in a two-step tender offer,
freezeout transaction. Cinerama, Inc., a shareholder of Techni-
color, dissented in the freezeout merger and sought appraisal of
its shares. In the course of the appraisal proceeding, Cinerama
discovered evidence of fraud and, therefore, amended its ap-
praisal proceeding to include a fraud count. In Technicolor I,"
the Supreme Court of Delaware had held that the Court of
Chancery erred in requiring Cinerama to make an election of
remedies before trial. Upon remand, the Court of Chancery
rendered its appraisal opinion first, finding that the fair value
of Technicolor shares held by Cinerama was $ 21.60 per share
even though MAF had paid $23 per share in the tender offer
and in the freezeout merger. 4
In Technicolor II, the Delaware Supreme Court found that
the Technicolor board had violated its duty of care, reasoning:
Applying Van Gorkom to the trial court's presumed findings of
director and board gross negligence, we find the defendant direc-
tors, as a board, to have breached their duty of care by reaching
an uninformed decision on October 29, 1982, which consisted of
71 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993) (Technicolor II).
72 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 4.01(d).
73 542 A.2d 1182 (Del. 1988) (Technicolor 1).
14 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. Civ. A. 7129, 1990 WL 161084 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 19, 1990) (Technicolor Appraisal Decision).
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approving the sale price of $23. We hold that the merger plan
approved by the defendant directors on October 29, 1982, must,
on remand, be reviewed for its entire fairness, applying
Weinberger.
75
Also, in Technicolor II, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected
the Chancellor's approach of requiring Cinerama to prove injury
in order to rebut the presumption of the business judgment
rule. The Chancellor had found that the proof of injury element
had not been met because of the earlier finding in the Techni-
color Appraisal Decision that the fair value of the shares was
$21.60. 76 The Delaware Supreme Court described the Chan-
cellor's approach as follows:
The Chancellor concluded that the 'fatal weakness in plaintiffs
case' was plantiffs failure to prove that it had been injured as a
result of the defendant's negligence. The court put it this way:
It is not the case, in my opinion, that in an arm's-length third
party merger, proof of a breach of the board's duty of care itself
entitles plaintiff to judgment. Rather, in such a case, as in any
case in which the gist of the claim is negligence, plaintiff bears
the burden to establish that the negligence shown was the proxi-
mate cause of some injury to it and what the injury was.'
77
The court went on to explain that if the plaintiff was re-
quired to show damages, the directors who were found to have
breached their duty of care would be relieved of establishing
the entire fairness of the transaction under the Weinberger
standard."8 In remanding for a determination of the entire fair-
ness of the transaction, the court said that the "measure of any
recoverable loss by Cinerama under an entire fairness standard
of review is not necessarily limited to the difference between
the price offered and the 'true' value as determined under ap-
praisal proceedings."7 '9 And, the court added that "[u]nder
Weinberger, the Chancellor may fashion any form of equitable
5 Technicolor II, 634 A.2d at 367.
6 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. Civ. A. 7129, 1990 WL 161084 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 19,1990).
"7 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 368-69 (Del. 1993) (citing
Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 616-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1924)).
78 Id. at 369.
79 I& at 371.
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and monetary relief as may be appropriate, including recissory
damages.8 °
In the opinion after remand in Technicolor II, the Chancellor
pointed out that his initial position to the effect that the plain-
tiff must show that the director's negligent breach was the
proximate cause of the injury suffered is consistent with the
approach taken by the Project in Section 4.01(d).8 The Chan-
cellor expressed the view that the entire fairness rule should
apply only where the duty of loyalty is violated. The Chancellor
went on to say:
That this Delaware version of the meaning and operation of the
business judgement rule makes that rule a liability enhancing
rule (i.e., it disadvantages director defendants when compared to
other classes of persons charged with negligently causing injury
to another) was not the subject of comment in the court's opin-
ion.82
The Chancellor went on to find that the defendants satisfied
their burden of establishing that the transaction was entirely
fair. Also, the Chancellor found that the plaintiffs were not
entitled to recissory damages because the Technicolor directors
did not "profit at the plaintiffs' expense via the MAF transac-
tion."'
The Delaware Supreme Court in Technicolor II1s affirmed
the Chancellor's finding that the transaction was entirely fair.
The court said that under the entire fairness test, the defen-
dant must show that the price offered was the "highest price
reasonably available[,]"' 5 and the court, in an elaborate analy-




"' Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1137 (Del. Ch. 1994).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1147.
' Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995)
85 Id. at 1177.
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III. ARM'S LENGTH MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
A. Introduction to Section 6.01
Section 6.01(a) governs the actions of a target's directors in a
transaction in control, and Section 6.01(b) specifies the votes
required by the shareholders of both the acquiror and the tar-
get in a transaction in control. The Project explains that Sec-
tion 6.01(a) does not, however, apply to actions taken by a
target's directors in resisting a tender offer to the target's
shareholders, or to a transaction in control in which the target's
directors or principal senior executives are interested, that is, a
management buyout.86 Also, Section 6.01(a) has no role in
freezeout transactions. Thus, Section 6.01(a) provides gover-
nance rules only for a target's directors in arm's length transac-
tions in control.
Defensive actions in tender offers are governed by Section
6.02;87 management buyouts are governed by Section 5.15;88
and freezeouts are governed by Section 5.10 and 7.25.9
Section 6.01(a) provides that a target's board of directors in
the exercise of its business judgment, as provided in Section
4.01(c),90 "may approve, reject, or decline to consider a pro-
posal to the corporation to engage in a transaction in cont-
rol . . ." Section 6.01(b) provides that a "transaction in con-
trol of the corporation to which the corporation is a party
should require approval by the shareholders ..
B. Definition of Transaction in Control
The term "transaction in control" is defined in Section 1.38 of
the Project to embrace the following three forms of acquisition:
s6 1 ALI CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 6.01 cmt. a(l),
at 389.
87 See infra Part V.
See infra Part IV.
89 See infra Part VII.
' See supra Part H.C.
91 1 ALI CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 6.01(a).
9 Id. § 6.01(b).
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(1) A business combination effected [either directly or by
means of a subsidiary] through (1) a merger, (2) a consolidation,
(3) an issuance of voting equity securities [for, in essence, sub-
stantially all of the assets of another corporation], or (4) an issu-
ance of voting equity securities in exchange for at least a major-
ity of the voting equity securities of another corporation...;
(2) A sale of assets that would leave the corporation without a
significant continuing business;
(3) An issuance of securities or any other transaction by the
corporation [(other than a business combination described in the
first paragraph above)] that, alone or in conjunction with other
transactions or circumstances, causes a change in control .. . of
the corporation.... ."
Under this broad definition, "transactions in control" encom-
pass various forms of transactions in which the stock or assets
of a target are acquired, including management buyouts. In all
of these transactions, the Project gives the target's shareholders
and, subject to the continuity of interest rule of Section
1.38(b)(3), discussed below, the acquiror's shareholders, the
right to vote.
94
It is important to note that a "transaction in control" does
not include the acquisition of stock of a target through a cash
tender offer to the shareholders of the target." However, un-
der the first form of acquisition listed in Section 1.38 of the
Project above, a "transaction in control" occurs in subsection (4)
with respect to the acquiror (but not the target) on the acquisi-
tion by the acquiror of at least a majority of the target's stock
in exchange for voting stock of the acquiror. Thus, a tax-free
stock for stock reorganization under Section 368(a)(1)(B) of the
Internal Revenue Code in which an acquiror acquires at least
80% of the stock of a target in exchange for voting stock of the
acquiror would constitute a transaction in control for the ac-
quiror, unless the continuity of interest rule of Section
1.38(b)(3), which is discussed below, applies.
Under the above definition, transactions in control also en-
compass all forms of subsidiary mergers, except where the con-
tinuity of interest rule applies. Thus, for example, in a reverse
subsidiary merger in which a subsidiary of the acquiror merges
"' Id. § 1.38(a).
94 Id. § 6.01(b).
95 Id. § 1.38 cmt. c, at 45.
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into the target with the target's shareholders receiving stock of
the acquiror, the merger is a transaction in control with respect
to both the acquiror and the target, unless the continuity of
interest rule applies.
Under Section 1.38(b)(3), which sets out a continuity of inter-
est rule, a transaction in control does not include, inter alia, a
merger or similar transaction described under Section 1.38(a)(1)
above, if those persons who were the "holders of voting equity
securities in the corporation immediately before the transaction
would own immediately after the transaction at least 75 per-
cent of the surviving corporation's voting equity securities, in
substantially the same proportions in relation to other preexist-
ing shareholders of the corporation." Thus, for example, if
the shareholders of the acquiror continue to own at least 75%
of the acquiror's stock after a merger or stock for stock acquisi-
tion, the transaction is not a transaction in control with respect
to the acquiror. This rule is consistent with Section 251(f) of
the Delaware General Corporation Law and Section 11.03(g)(3)
of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, although both
of those provisions contain a 20% dilution standard."
Section 1.38 represents a codification of the de facto merger
doctrine. Under this doctrine, courts have treated acquisitions
that in form are not mergers as mergers in substance, thereby
giving the target's shareholders voting and appraisal rights.
The Project explains that "Section 1.38 seeks to avoid the diffi-
culties encountered by courts and legislatures in dealing with
the de facto merger problem by defining the range of transac-
tions of concern by reference to their substance, rather than
their form."98
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed the ALr's ap-
proach in Farris v. Glen Alden Corp.,99 where it treated a pur-
chase of a target's assets as a merger. Thus, the Project rejects
the "equal dignity" approach taken by the Delaware Supreme
Court in Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc..00 The Project ex-
Id. § 1.38(b)(3).
9 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(f) (1990); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 11.03(g)(3) (1994).
98 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 1.38 cmt. c(1),
at 44.
9 143 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958)
100 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963).
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plains that the equal dignity doctrine treats the "alternative
transactional forms authorized by the corporate statute - mer-
ger, triangular merger, and sale of assets - as of 'equal digni-
ty,' with the result that the planner's choice of transaction form
is respected.""'' The next section illustrates several situations
in which the Project incorporates the de facto merger doctrine.
C. General Impact of Shareholder Vote Requirement Under
Section 6.01(b)
The requirement in Section 6.01(b) for a shareholder vote on
transactions in control, as defined in Section 1.38,102 is de-
signed to mandate such vote without regard to the form the
transaction takes. Thus, Section 6.01(b) and Section 1.38 imple-
ment the de facto merger doctrine 3 with regard to share-
holder voting by providing for voting by the shareholders of
both the target and the acquiring corporation in virtually all
merger and acquisition transactions in which board action is
required. As indicated in Section III.F.2, a similar de facto
merger standard applies for purposes of determining appraisal
rights.
As indicated above, a shareholder vote is not required by the
shareholders of either the target or the acquiror if such share-
holders own at least 75% of the stock of the surviving corpora-
tion.'O'
The implementation of the de facto merger doctrine can be
illustrated by considering the treatment under the Project of
the asset acquisition in Farris v. Glen Alden Corp.,"5 the
triangular merger in Terry v. Penn Central Corp.,"°6 and the
stock acquisitions in Orzeck v. Englehart" and in Applestein
v. United Board and Carton Corp.0 8
101 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 1.38 cmt. a, at
43.
102 See supra Part 1II.B.
103 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 6.01 cmt. a, at
389-90. The treatment of the de facto merger doctrine under the ALI rules is
not examined here in detail.
104 Id. at 390; see id. § 1.38(b)(3).
105 143 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958).
106 668 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1981).
'07 195 A-2d 375 (Del. 1963).
'08 159 A.2d 146 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1960), affd, 161 A.2d 474 (N.J.
1960).
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In Glen Alden, the corporation that was actually the target
(the real target) acquired in exchange for its stock the assets
and liabilities of the corporation that was in fact the acquiror
(the real acquiror), and the real acquiror was liquidated, dis-
tributing the stock received to its shareholders. As a result of
the transaction, the shareholders of the real acquiror ended up
controlling the real target.0 9
Under the Pennsylvania business corporation law, the share-
holders of the real target were not given a vote on the transac-
tion because the real target had not engaged in a merger and
had not disposed of all or substantially all of its assets, but
rather had merely issued authorized but unissued shares in the
acquisition of the assets of the real acquiror. On the other
hand, since the real acquiror had disposed of "substantially all"
of its assets, its shareholders were given a vote. The Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court, in adopting the de facto merger doctrine,
held that in light of the "consequences of the transaction and
... the purposes of the [merger] provisions of the corporation
law . ..,""0 the transaction was the economic equivalent of a
merger and would be treated as such. Consequently, the share-
holders of the real target were given the right to vote and to
dissent on the transaction.
Under Sections 1.38(a)(1)(ii) and (a)(2) of the Project, the
transaction in Glen Alden would be a transaction in control of
(1) the real target, because it has issued its stock in exchange
for all of the assets of the real acquiror,"'. and (2) the real
acquiror because it has sold its assets and does not have a
significant continuing business." Consequently, under Sec-
tion 6.01(b), the shareholders of both corporations would have
the right to vote, unless the shareholders of the real acquiror
ended up with at least 75% of the stock of the real target, in
which case the shareholders of the real acquiror would not have
the right to vote.
Terry v. Penn Central Corp. involved a forward triangular
merger in which Penn Central (the acquiring parent) was going
to acquire Colt Industries (the target) by having Colt merge
" Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958).
"0 Id. at 28.
, 1 ALI CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 1.38(a)(1)(ii).
2 Id. § 1.38(a)(2).
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into a wholly-owned subsidiary (acquiring sub) of Penn Cen-
tral.1 1 3 The Pennsylvania business corporation law did not
give the shareholders of Penn Central a vote on the transaction
because Penn Central was not a party to the merger. The two
parties to the merger were the acquiring sub and the target.
Shareholders of Penn Central challenged the transaction on the
grounds that the acquisition was a de facto merger involving
Penn Central, and consequently, the shareholders of Penn Cen-
tral had the right to vote and to dissent."4 The Third Circuit,
applying Pennsylvania law, first noted that the Pennsylvania
legislature had overridden the de facto merger doctrine as adop-
ted by Glen Alden, and consequently, the court refused to treat
Penn Central, the acquiring Parent, as a party to the merger.
Therefore, the shareholders of Penn Central did not have the
right to vote or to dissent on the transaction.'15
In this regard, Pennsylvania follows Delaware law under
which it is clear that the shareholders of the acquiring parent
in a triangular merger do not have the right to vote because (1)
the statute does not explicitly grant such a right,11 and (2)
Delaware has rejected the de facto merger doctrine in favor of
the equal dignity principle.117
Under Section 1.38(a)(1)(i) of the Project, the triangular mer-
ger in Penn Central would be a transaction in control with
respect to both the acquiring parent (Penn Central) and the
target, because the transaction is a merger effected by means of
a subsidiary. Consequently, the shareholders of both Penn Cen-
tral and the target would have the right to vote, unless the
shareholders of Penn Central held at least 75% of the stock of
Penn Central after the merger, in which case the shareholders
of Penn Central would not vote. Thus, the Project in essence,
rejects the holding of Penn Central and applies the de facto
merger doctrine to triangular mergers.
The Project also rejects the application of the equal dignity
principle by the Delaware Supreme Court in the stock acquisi-
113 668 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1981).
114 Id. at 189-90.
115 See also Equity Group Holdings v. DMG, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D.
Fla. 1983) (reaching the same result under Florida law).
"' The acquiring parent is not a constituent corporation. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit.8, § 251(c) (199_).
17 See, e.g., Hariton v. Arco Elec., Inc., 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963).
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tion in Orzeck v. Englehart."8 There, in essence, the real tar-
get issued its stock to the shareholders of the real acquiror in
exchange for all of the stock of the real acquiror."' The share-
holders of the real acquiror ended up in control of the real
target, which was in control of the real acquiror. After the
acquisition, the real acquiror was merged upstream into the
real target. Following Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., ° the
Delaware Supreme Court again rejected the de facto merger
principle and did not give the shareholders of the real target
the right to vote or dissent on the transaction.
Under Section 1.38(a)(1)(iv) of the Project, the transaction in
Orzeck would be a transaction in control of the real target,
because it issued its stock "in exchange for at least a majority
of the voting equity securities of another corporation."' 2 ' Con-
sequently, under Section 6.01(b) the shareholders of the real
target would have the right to vote on the transaction.
In adopting this principle, the Project thus codifies the appli-
cation of the de facto merger principle by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in the stock acquisition in Applestein v. United
Board and Carton Corp.' There the real target issued 40%
of its stock to the controlling shareholder of the real acquiror.
After the acquisition the real acquiror merged into the real
target. The court treated the transaction as de facto merger.
Presumably, if the merger had not taken place the court would
not have applied the de facto merger principle. Under the ALI
approach in Section 1.38(a)(1)(iv), the stock issuance in
Applestein would be treated as a transaction in control of the
real target because the real target issued its shares in ex-
change for at least a majority of the shares of the real acquiror,
and the shareholders of the real target did not own at least
75% of the stock of the real target (they owned only 60%) after
the transaction. This result obtains under the Project even if
there is no merger after the stock acquisition.
11 195 A.2d 375 (Del. 1963).
119 Id. at 376.
m Hariton, 188 A.2d at 123.
12 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 1.38(a)(1)(iv).
122 159 A.2d 146 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1960), affd, 161 A.2d 474 (N.J.
1960).
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D. General Impact of Director Action Requirement Under
Section 6.01(a): The Business Judgment Rule
1. Basic Concepts
Section 6.01(a) governs the actions of a target's board of
directors in a consensual merger or acquisition transaction.
Under this provision, the target's board may in the exercise of
its business judgment, as provided in Section 4.01(c),"2 "ap-
prove, reject, or decline to consider a proposal to the corpora-
tion to engage in a transaction in control.""u
The Project explains that Section 6.01(a) is consistent with
existing law, such as Section 141 of the Delaware General Cor-
poration Law, which provides that the directors shall manage
the corporation.' Furthermore, the Project explains that re-
view of a director's decision would be under the business judg-
ment rule in Section 4.01(c) for the "purpose of determining
both entitlement to injunctive relief against the directors' deci-
sion and the liability, if any, of the directors for their deci-
sion."'2' The Project does not address the extent to which a
corporate charter may provide for other rules governing trans-
actions in control, such as a fair price provision that requires
an extraordinary shareholder vote for a second step merger
providing for different consideration than that paid in the first
step.2
7
The Project emphasizes that the target's directors do not
"necessarily have an obligation even to consider a proposed
transaction in control." 128 The Project explains that "a policy
decision by the directors that the shareholders would be best
served by management concentrating its attention on operating
the corporation's business, rather than selling it, would be re-
viewed under the business judgment rule."2 9 On this point,
the Project says that "[m]anagement need not act as if the
business of the corporation is at all times up for sale." 30
1 See supra Part II.C.
124 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 6.01(a).
125 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
' Id. § 6.01 cmt. a, at 389.
r Id. reporters note 4, at 400.




Although the directors are not required to take affirmative
steps with regard to a particular proposal, if they seek share-
holder approval on a particular transaction, they must inform
the shareholders of "any pending, concrete, and clearly defined
alternative proposal."'31 Further, unless limited by statute or
charter provision, the directors have the power under the by-
laws to set reasonable ground rules regarding the existence of
shareholder voting rights.
13 2
The Project "takes no position on the validity of lock-ups
granted by the board of directors, without shareholder approv-
al .... 13 ' Lock-up devices are designed to protect a negotiat-
ed transaction with a favored party from competition from oth-
er parties by granting the favored party an option to acquire
the target's newly issued shares or selected assets, such as the
crown jewels."8 The stock option agreement used in the
Time-Warner acquisition is one illustration of a lock-up. 5
The Project points out that existing law does not provide a
consistent mode of analysis of lock-ups. Although some decisions
have "upheld the validity of lock-up devices" by following the
"routine application of the business judgment rule,"3 6 other
cases have "invalidated lock-up devices by application of a more
rigorous standard of review .... ""' For example, the Mills
Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., decision stated that defen-
sive measures that treat bidders unequally are subject to the
"enhanced judicial scrutiny" standard set out in Unocal. 8
Further, Section 6.01(a) would allow, in an appropriate case,
the target's directors to cause the corporation to enter a stand-
131 Id. at 391.
32 Id. cmt. d, at 392.
"1 Id. at 393.
13
4 Id.
13 See supra Part I.B.
'36 1 ALI CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 6.01 reporter's
note 8, at 404. See Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Inter North, 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir.
1980); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983).
137 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, reporter's note 8,
at 404. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d
Cir. 1986); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986).
'I' 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, reporter's note 8,
at 405. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1289 (Del.
1989).
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still agreement, under which a potential acquiring corporation
agrees not to make a tender offer without the approval of the
target's board.'
The Project also indicates that the requirement in Section
6.01(b) for shareholder approval is not intended to suggest the
invalidity of agreements (made by the target's board without
shareholder approval) that obligate a corporation to reimburse
the reasonable expenses of, or to pay an incentive or topping
fee to, an unsuccessful competing bidder, provided such fee
would not reasonably be expected to deter other bidders. 4 °
The Project points out that a target's directors fulfill their
obligations under the business judgment rule of Section 4.01(c)
if they satisfy the following conditions:
(1) inform themselves to the extent they reasonably believe to
be appropriate under the circumstances before making a decision,
(2) act in good faith,
(3) without being interested . . . in the subject of the decision,
and
(4) rationally believe that their action is in the best interests
of the corporation.
14 1
These elements are examined in Sections III.D.2, 3, and 4,
immediately below. As indicated in Section III.F.5, infra, if the
business judgment rule is satisfied and certain other basic
conditions are met, appraisal is the exclusive remedy for the
corporation's shareholders.
2. Duty to Inform
With regard to the duty of the directors to be informed, the
Project first points out that transactions in control can be ex-
tremely complex and that it is essential that directors be able
to rely on the advice of others and "not be faulted for reason-
able decisions not to read lengthy legal documents or conduct a
detailed cross-examination of those upon whom they reasonably
rely.
" 142
139 1 ALI CoRPORATE GOVERNANcE PROJEcT, supra note 1, reporter's note 8,
at 405.
'40 Id. § 6.01 cmt. d, at 393.
141 Id. § 6.01 cmt. e, at 393-94 (emphasis added).
'42 Id. at 394.
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The Project further says that whether fair value is "given or
received in a transaction in control is often susceptible of wide-
ly varying opinions."' Although valuation opinions of experts
may be helpful, directors should not be required to obtain such
opinions "at the risk of incurring personal liability if they fail
to do so, unless it is clear that internal resources are unavail-
able to satisfy the directors' duty of inquiry.
" 44
The Project says that the directors are not required to deter-
mine a "single 'intrinsic' value of their corporation"' and
that "[a]ny suggestion in Smith v. Van Gorkom that directors
have a duty to ascertain a single intrinsic value is not adopt-
ed."'46
In discharging their responsibilities under Section 6.01(a),
the directors of the target are generally not required to "initiate
a formal auction of the corporation, in which the corporation is
sold to the highest bidder .. . .147 If the directors "have rea-
sonably informed themselves as to their corporation's worth,
they may enter into a negotiated agreement to sell the corpora-
tion to an unrelated third party for what they consider to be
fair value."' Also, the directors may bind themselves not to
negotiate with others pending completion of the transaction,
"provided they do not interfere with the ability of the share-
holders to reject the proposed transaction or to accept a compet-
ing proposal." 49
If the target's directors satisfy the business judgment rule
under Section 4.01(c), they will not be held responsible for "loss
of a bid submitted on condition that it be accepted within a
limited time period specified by the bidder, or on condition that
the bidder receive preferential treatment."5 ' The target's di-
rectors may reject all bids; however, if they do not reject all the
bids and a bidding contest develops, the "directors will be obli-
gated to accept the bid that is most favorable to the sharehold-
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term interests of the shareholders and would better protect the
interests of groups other than the shareholders with which the
corporation has a legitimate concern ... .51 Thus, to a limit-
ed extent, the directors may give consideration to the interests
of other constituencies. The standard of not significantly dis-
favoring the long-term interests of the shareholders is explicitly
set forth in Section 6.02, which governs defensive tactics in
tender offers.152 It is not, however, explicitly set forth in Sec-
tion 6.01.
If a bidding contest develops the directors may in the exer-
cise of their business judgment provide for a mechanism for
ending the contest, including the use of lock-up devices, provid-
ed the intent to end and the manner of ending the bidding
contest is communicated to all of the bidders.
153
If the target is being sold for securities of a publicly traded
acquiring corporation, the target's directors should be entitled
to rely on the SEC filings of the acquiring corporation, unless
the directors have reason to believe that the SEC filings are
inaccurate or require further investigation."5 If the acquiring
corporation is privately held, the target's directors should
"insist on sufficient information upon which they can rely to
satisfy themselves as to the value of the securities they have
received ... .155
3. Disclosure and Approval Negate Personal Liability
Finally, even if disinterested directors fail to satisfy the busi-
ness judgment rule, they are not subject to personal liability as
long as full disclosure of all material facts has been made to
the shareholders, and shareholders have approved the transac-
tion and have appraisal rights.55
151 Id.
152 See infra Part V.
153 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 6.01 cmt. e, at
395.
'54 Id. at 395-96.
'- Id. at 396.
156 Id.
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4. Action in Good Faith and Absence of Interest
The Project says that "[aiction in good faith requires that
directors not act in knowing violation of substantive rules of
law (including substantive rules of law applicable to take-
overs)."'5 7
Usual and customary directors' fees and perquisites, even if a
significant portion of a director's income, do not make the direc-
tor interested in the transaction. Thus, as a general rule, out-
side directors will not have an interest in the transaction. If,
however, "a director is to receive a substantial severance pay-
ment as a condition to action or inaction, the director might
well be so interested in the outcome of the transaction as to
fall outside the protection of the business judgment rule."5 '
5. Rational Belief that Action is in Best Interest of the
Corporation
The rational belief requirement is "intended to give a much
wider scope to directors' discretion than the term 'reason-
ably'." 59 Thus, directors are to have a "wide ambit of discre-
tion, not only in determining the price to be paid or received
upon purchase or sale of a business, but also as to such other
matters as determining the appropriate time to sell the busi-
ness [and] the nature of consideration to be received .... 0
By way of example, the Project says that disinterested direc-
tors may make a decision that may be more favorable to some
shareholders than to others, such as a decision to negotiate a
tax-free or taxable transaction.
161
E. Illustration of Operation of Section 6.01
The Project contains an illustration of the operation of Sec-
tion 6.01 that is based on facts similar to those in Van
Gorkom.'62 The target corporation is a publicly held corpora-
157 Id.




" Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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tion whose stock is trading in the $15-$20 range. A, the chief
executive of the target, asks B, the chief financial officer, to
prepare an analysis of the potential sales price of the target. B
had available a recent valuation of the target's substantial
timber assets. B concluded that a range of $25-$30 per share
was acceptable. The premium was similar to that paid in acqui-
sitions of comparable companies.
A negotiated a merger agreement with an acquiring corpora-
tion calling for a price of $27.50 per share. The merger agree-
ment obligated the target not to shop the deal. A presented the
proposed merger agreement to the target's directors, who ap-
proved the transaction after a single long meeting relying on
the appraisal and on prices paid for comparable companies, but
without reading the merger agreement. After full disclosure to
the shareholders of the material facts, the shareholders ap-
proved the transaction as required by law. Shareholders who
did not vote for the transaction sued to have the directors held
liable for selling the target for an inadequate price. The exam-
ple holds that the directors' action in approving the merger
agreement is protected by the business judgment rule.'63
There are several salient differences between this example
and the facts in Van Gorkom, where the Delaware Supreme
Court held that the target's board members did not receive the
protection of the business judgment rule because they were
grossly negligent in failing to inform themselves.' First, in
Van Gorkom, the Chief Executive Officer negotiated the merger
price with the acquiror without the full participation of his
chief financial officer." 5 Second, the board in Van Gorkom
relied on the Chief Executive Officer without diligently consid-
ering all aspects of the proposed transaction, including how the
Chief Executive Officer arrived at the price." Third, the
board failed to disclose all of the relevant facts to the share-
holders.'
67
Ir' 1 ALI CoRPoRATE GovERNANcE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 6.01 cmt. f,
illus. 1, at 399.
164 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874.
'5 Id. at 877.
16 Id.
167 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 890-93 (Del. 1985).
[Vol. 1996
No. 2:145] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 183
F. The General Appraisal Remedy
1. Introduction
This section outlines in general scope the appraisal rules
contained in Sections 7.21 through 7.25. Under these rules a
shareholder who has the right to vote on a merger, acquisition
or other transaction in control and who votes against the pro-
posed transaction may elect to have the value of her shares
appraised in a court proceeding. In such case, in lieu of receiv-
ing the consideration specified in the merger or acquisition
documents, the shareholder receives a cash payment in the
amount of the value determined by the appraisal court.
The Project points out that although the appraisal remedy
has been criticized as being too restrictive, others argue that a
more liberalized remedy would invite non-meritorious liti-
gation.' 8 One study of the appraisal process found that be-
tween 1972 and 1981 there were over 16,000 mergers but only
approximately 20 reported state court appraisal decisions. 6 9
The Reporter's Notes' 70 say that the most likely explana-
tion for the limited use of appraisal proceedings is that the
"remedy is costly, while the outcomes remain very uncer-
tain."' 71 This uncertainty is illustrated in the appraisal pro-
ceedings in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.'72 There the ap-
praisal court found that the value of a target's shares acquired
in a second step freezeout merger was $21.60 even though the
acquiror had paid $23.00 for the target's shares in a tender
offer that took place just before the freezeout merger.
The Reporter's Notes say that the low rate of utilization of
the appraisal remedy creates an "obvious incentive for those in
control of the corporation to offer less than fair value."' 3 The
163 2 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, introductory
note, at 294.
'6
9 Id. (citing Joel Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 829, 829 n.3 (1984)).
17 An introductory note points out that the Reporter's Notes are those of
the reporters and not the American Law Institute. 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVER-
NANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, at XXV.
'7 2 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, reporter's note 3,
at 298.
172 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. Civ. A. 7129, 1990 WL 161084 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 19, 1990).
173 2 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, reporter's note 3,
Notes speculate that it may be for this reason that in
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,'74 the Delaware Supreme Court said
in the context of a freezeout merger that the appraisal remedy
is not likely to be adequate "where fraud, misrepresentation,
self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or gross and
palpable overreaching are involved."" 5
The Project goes on to say that the exclusivity of the apprais-
al remedy can be justified only if "(i) the procedures applicable
to the appraisal remedy minimize those barriers that now in-
hibit its exercise by eligible shareholders, and (ii) some limited
exceptions to exclusivity are recognized in those circumstances
where conflicts of interest are most apparent."17 6
The Project explains that the approach taken in Sections 7.21
through 7.25 reduces the transaction costs applicable to ap-
praisal proceedings by (1) reducing the required procedural
steps; (2) establishing procedures for informing shareholders of
the "availability of a realistic means" by which to contest the
corporation's estimate of fair market value; (3) providing a
mechanism for the use of common counsel by the dissenting
shareholders; and (4) assuring early payments to dissenters of
the estimated fair market value, with a fair interest rate.
177
The Project goes on to say that if a "low cost, simple, and fair
remedy can be provided in a centralized forum, there is less
reason to permit multiple actions to be filed in different juris-
dictions seeking to enjoin the contemplated transaction."
178
2. Transactions in Control Giving Rise to Appraisal Rights
Section 7.21 provides that a shareholder should be entitled
on demand to be paid the fair value of his or her shares on the
occurrence of, inter alia, the following four types of acquisitions:
(1) both direct and subsidiary mergers, consolidations, issu-
ances by an acquiring corporation of its stock for substantial
assets or stock of a target, and mandatory share exchanges, (i.e.,
at 298.
74 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
175 Id. at 714.
176 2 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, introductory
note, at 295.
'77Id. at 295-96.
178 Id. at 296.
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a business combination), unless the shareholders of the target or
acquiring corporation own proportionately at least 60% of the
stock of the acquiring corporation after the transaction;79
(2) all types of freezeout mergers and similar transactions; 8
(3) a sale or disposition of substantial assets that leaves the
target without a significant continuing business, unless the sale
is in the ordinary course or is for cash or cash equivalents and
the target is liquidated."8 '
(4) a management buyout under Section 5.15 effected through
a sale of any amount of the target's assets, unless the market
test procedures specified in Section 5.15(b) are followed.
8 2
Thus, Section 7.21 encompasses a "range of transactions that
would normally constitute a 'transaction in control' ... .,
The Reporter's Notes explain that a prior draft of the Project
provided for appraisal rights in a "going private" transaction in
which a person acquired a controlling interest in the target and
as a result of the acquisition, stock of the target is no longer
held by at least 300 shareholders or the target ceased to be a
listed company. This rule, which did not apply to tender offers
for all of a target's shares, was rejected by the ALI.M
The balance of this section of this article focuses principally
on appraisal rights in arm's length mergers and acquisitions.
In a merger, consolidation or issuance of stock for assets, the
shareholders of both the acquiring and target corporations are
entitled to the appraisal remedy, unless the shareholders of the
acquiror (and presumably the shareholders of the target) con-
tinue to own after the transaction at least 60% of the outstand-
ing stock of the surviving corporation." Thus, if this 60%
continuity of stock interest test is met the acquiror's (or tar-
get's) shareholders do not have appraisal rights.
On an issuance of stock of the acquiring corporation for stock
of the target in an exchange offer (such as in a stock for stock
tax-free (B) reorganization under Section 368(a)(1)(B) of the
Internal Revenue Code), the shareholders of the target do not
179 Id. § 7.21(a).
180 Id. § 7.21(b).
181 Id. § 7.21(c).
182 Id. § 7.21 cmt. c, at 306, and § 7.21(c)(1).
18 Id. at 302.
'84 Id. reporter's note 3, at 312-13.
185 Id. § 7.21 cmt. c, at 301-02.
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have appraisal rights. Furthermore, the shareholders of the
acquiring corporation have appraisal rights only if the acquiror
issues more than 40% of its voting stock to the target's share-
holders." 6 If more than 40% of the acquiror's stock is issued,
the 60% continuity requirement is not satisfied.
In a triangular (subsidiary) merger a target and a subsid-
iary (acquiring sub) of an acquiring parent merge, with either
the target or the acquiring sub surviving. If the target's share-
holders receive stock of the acquiring parent, the shareholders
of the acquiring parent have dissenters' rights, unless the ac-
quiring parent issues less than 40% of its voting stock in the
merger. 87 If the acquiring parent does not issue any of its
stock, the shareholders of the acquiring parent have no apprais-
al rights. The target's shareholders have dissenters' rights in
such a transaction, unless the target's shareholders end up
owning at least 60% of the stock of the acquiring parent.
The Project explains that Section 7.21(a) is intended to en-
compass "approximately the same functional reach as the 'de
facto' merger doctrine .... " The Project follows the lead of
California and Ohio, which in essence have codified the de facto
merger doctrine, and reject the equal dignity rule of Dela-
ware.1 9 Under Sections 251 and 263 of the Delaware General
Corporation Law, the shareholders of the acquiring parent in a
triangular merger do not have the right to vote or the right of
appraisal, even though stock of the acquiring parent is used as
the merger consideration.' On the other hand, under Sec-
tions 1201 and 1300 of the California Corporations Code, the
shareholders of such an acquiring parent generally have the
right to vote and to dissent.'9 1
Under Section 1.38 of the Project, a transaction in control
does not take place if the acquiror's shareholders retain a 75%
continuity of interest in the acquiror. In such case, the ac-
quiror's shareholders do not have a right to vote on the trans-
'86Id. at 304.
18 Id. at 302.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 303.
11 2 ERNEST L. FOLK III, RODMAN WARD, JR. & EDWARD P. WELCH, FOLK
ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW, §§ 251.2.5 and 263 (3d ed.
1995) [hereinafter Folk on Delaware]. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, §§ 251
and 263 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
... CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1201 and 1300 (West Supp. 1996).
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action as provided in Section 6.01(b). Section 7.21 denies ap-
praisal rights to the acquiror's shareholders if they retain a
60% continuity. Thus, there is a 75% continuity requirement for
denial of the vote and a 60% continuity requirement for denial
of appraisal rights. The operation of these two continuity rules
is illustrated as follows:
Acquiror's Voting Stock Acquiror's Aquiror's







Most states, have a single continuity standard for both vot-
ing and appraisal. For example, Delaware has a 20% continuity
standard requirement for both voting and appraisal.'92
As explained above, Section 7.21(c)(2) provides for appraisal
rights for a target's shareholders on a sale of the target's assets
that leaves the target without a significant continuing business,
unless the sale is in the ordinary course of business or is for
cash or cash equivalents and the target is liquidated. Thus,
appraisal rights arise in various types of arm's length mergers,
stock acquisitions and asset acquisitions.
The Project rejects the exclusion from the appraisal remedy
for publicly traded shares such as that contained in Section
262(b)(1) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (the "mar-
ket exclusion"). 93 The Project explains that 23 jurisdictions
have adopted similar provisions.'" The Project gives the fol-
lowing three reasons for rejecting the market exclusion: (1) "the
market's valuation may reflect the prospect of future adverse
"9 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251 and 263 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
193 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1) (Supp. 1994).
194 2 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 7.21 cmt. d, at
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impact or other disadvantage to the minority shareholders;" 195
(2) "management may possess material, non-public information
about the corporation;"196 and (3) if the "appraisal remedy is
unavailable, it can hardly be exclusive, and thus plaintiffs will
pursue injunctive or other equitable remedies." 97
3. General Procedural Requirements
Section 7.23 sets out the procedural requirements relating to
the appraisal remedy. Under Section 7.23(a), a corporation that
proposes to engage in a transaction giving rise to appraisal
rights is required to give notice of such rights to the sharehold-
ers, describe the method of exercising the right, disclose materi-
al facts concerning the transaction, provide financial statements
for the corporation, and provide a reasonable means for share-
holders to "easily and effectively indicate their election to dis-
sent."98 Under Section 7.23(b), shareholders are to be given a
reasonable means of indicating their dissent.
Under Section 7.23(c), promptly after the transaction, the
corporation is required to pay in cash to the dissenting share-
holders the amount the corporation determines to be a reason-
able estimate of the fair value of the shares, plus interest.
Under Section 7.23(d), the costs and expenses are to be as-
sessed or apportioned as the court deems equitable, subject to
the following exceptions. First, if the corporation does not make
the payment required by Section 7.23(c) within 30 days after
the consummation of the transaction or the tendering of the
shares, if later, or if the amount paid is materially less than
the amount ultimately determined to be the fair value, then the
corporation is responsible for all fees and expenses. The corpor-
ation's fees and expenses will be assessed against the dissent-
ing shareholder only if the shareholder's action was "arbitrary,
vexatious, or not in good faith."' 99
Under Section 7.23(e) interest is to be paid from the time of
the transaction.
'9 Id. at 309.
'96 Id. at 310.
197 Id.
" Id. at § 7.23(a)(iv).
"' Id. at § 7.23(d).
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Section 7.23(f) provides for the litigation of appraisal proceed-
ings in a consolidated proceeding, with the court having the
right to appoint lead counsel for the dissenters.
4. Standards for Determining Fair Value
a. In General
Section 7.22, which sets forth the standards for determining
"fair value" in an appraisal proceeding, provides that such
value is to be determined "without any discount for minority
status or, absent extraordinary circumstances, lack of market-
ability" and, except as provided in Sections 7.22(b) and (c),
"should be determined using customary valuation concepts and
techniques generally employed in the relevant securities and
financial markets for similar businesses in the context of the
transaction giving rise to appraisal."0 0 The Project explains
that Section 7.22(a) follows the law in New York and Delaware
in requiring that the court use the "relevant financial valuation
techniques generally employed in the financial community." '
In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,"2 the Delaware Supreme Court
held that in determining fair value an appraisal court is to
take into account all relevant factors which include modern
valuation techniques such as the discounted cash flow (DCF)
technique used by the plaintiffs expert. This DCF technique is
a four-step process that involves first, an estimate of the free
cash flows from operations for some foreseeable or horizon
period; second, an estimate of a terminal or residual value at
the end of the horizon period; and third, a determination of the
appropriate cost of capital or discount rate for the business.
Finally, the free cash flows and terminal value are then dis-
counted at the cost of capital to determine the present value or
fair market value of the business.
2 0 3
200 Id. at § 7.22(a).
201 Id. cmt. a, at 315-16.
202 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
203 2 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJEcT, supra note 1, reporter's note 1,
at 330.
b. Fair Value in Arm's Length Transactions
Section 7.22(b) provides an exception to the above rule for
arm's length business combinations, that is, transactions that
are not (1) management buyouts under Section 5.15, (2) freeze-
outs under Section 5.10, or (3) freezeouts involving a controlling
shareholder under Section 7.25. These three transactions are
referred to here as interested-party acquisitions.
The Project explains that in an arm's length acquisition, the
aggregate price accepted by the target's directors "should be
presumed to represent the fair value of the corporation, or of
the assets sold in the case of an asset sale, unless the plaintiff
can prove otherwise by clear and convincing evidence."2 The
Project further says that in third party mergers, the "prevailing
valuation approaches in the relevant market should gov-
ern,"20 5 and "the price negotiated by the board [is to be] pre-
sumptive evidence of fair value." °6 Thus, the presumption
given to the value of the transaction determined by the board
would not be overcome by evidence from investment bankers
concerning the hypothetical break-up value of the firm, because
such evidence is too speculative to amount to clear and convinc-
ing evidence. °7
This presumption is given for third party transactions be-
cause "management generally has every incentive to obtain the
highest possible price ... ."20' By placing the burden on the
dissenters, Section 7.22(b) is consistent with the business judg-
ment rule and will discourage nuisance litigation.2° The pre-
sumption in Section 7.22(b) should not, however, apply where
there is a "substantial possibility of a conflict of interest,"
2 10
such as an acquisition requiring an allocation of consideration
among different classes of shares, or if the managers of the
target receive long-term employment contracts from an acquiror
that did not have the highest bid.211
204 Id. § 7.22(b).
205 Id. § 7.22 cmt. a, at 316.
206 Id. cmt. c, at 316.
207 Id. illus. 1, at 317.
208 Id. cmt. c, at 316.
209 Id. at 316-17.
210 Id. at 317.
211 Id. illus. 2 and 3, at 317-18.
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The Project explains that the purpose of the appraisal rem-
edy is to allow shareholders to "police conflicts of interest that
may arise in connection with the sale or disposition of the
firm," and "[in the absence of a conflict of interest," there is
little justification for upsetting the bargain reached by the
selling and purchasing firms.2" The Project says that the pre-
sumption in Section 7.22(b) "will generally be overcome only
when there is evidence of passivity on the part of the board or
of an incentive or interest that caused it not to bargain vigor-
ously. "
2 13
The Project contains three illustrations of the application of
the clear and convincing proof standard in arm's length trans-
actions. In the first example, the acquiror and target negotiate
an all stock merger at an exchange ratio reflecting the current
trading value of the stock of each corporation. Even though
investment bankers could testify that the break-up value of
each of the corporations is substantially greater than the cur-
rent trading value, this testimony would not constitute clear
and convincing evidence needed to overcome the presumption
set forth in Section 7.22(b) "that the aggregate price accepted
by the board of directors of the subject corporation . . . repre-
sent[s] fair value of the corporation ....
On the other hand, evidence that a target's senior executives
received long-term employment contracts with a significant
increase in compensation from a successful but low bidder could
constitute "clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome
the presumption [of fair value] created by Section 7.22(b). 215
5. Exclusivity of Appraisal Remedy
a. In General
As set out more fully below, pursuant to Section 7.24,
appraisal is generally the exclusive remedy in arm's length
mergers and acquisitions.2 16 Appraisal is not, however, the ex-
212 Id. cmt. c, at 317.
213 Id. cmt. d, at 320 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del.
1985)).
214 Id. § 7.22(b).
215 Id. § 7.22 cmt. c, illus. 2, at 318.
216 See infra Part III.F.5.b.
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clusive remedy in management buyouts2 1' and in non-majority
control freezeouts.2 1 8 In certain cases, appraisal may be the
exclusive remedy under Section 7.25 in majority-control freeze-
outs.219 Thus, an "injunction remedy in which issues of sub-
stantive fairness can be litigated"220 is only permitted in "in-
terested combinations" (i.e., management buyouts and non-Sec-
tion 7.25 freezeouts) where "the self-interest of a controlling
shareholder, directors, or principal senior executives is [funda-
mentally] in conflict with that of the minority sharehold-
ers . .. 221
b. Exclusivity of Appraisal Proceedings for Arm's Length
Mergers and Acquisitions
Under Section 7.21, the appraisal remedy is available to the
target's shareholders in all forms of arm's length mergers and
acquisitions discussed in Part III, unless such shareholders own
after the transaction at least 60% of the outstanding stock of
the acquiror.222 Also, under Section 7.21(a), appraisal is avail-
able to the shareholders of the acquiring corporation unless
they continue to own at least 60% of the outstanding stock of
the acquiror after the transaction.2' Thus, for example, if the
shareholders of an acquiror in a merger end up with a 60% or
greater interest in the surviving firm, such shareholders do not
have appraisal rights. As pointed out in Part III.F.2, this 60%
continuity exception to appraisal rights is less restrictive than
the 75% continuity exception to voting rights in a transaction
in control under Section 1.38(b)(3). Consequently, if the share-
holders of an acquiror end up with less than 75% but more
than 60% of the stock of the surviving firm, such shareholders
have the right to vote but not the right to dissent.
Section 7.24(a) provides that, if the following three conditions
are satisfied, this appraisal right in an arm's length transaction
is the exclusive remedy to challenge an arm's length merger
217 See infra Part IV.C.3.
218 See infra Part VI.B.4.c.
219 See infra Part VII.C.2.c.
2202 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, introductory
note, at 296.
221 Id.
222 See supra Parts Ill.F.1-2.
223 See supra Part III.F.2.
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and acquisition. First, the shareholders who are entitled to
authorize the transaction must receive disclosure concerning the
transaction.2" Second, the transaction must be approved pur-
suant to law and the corporation's charter documents.2
Third, the shareholders who are entitled to vote on the transac-
tion, but do not, must be entitled to an appraisal remedy con-
sistent with the principles embodied in Sections 7.22 and
7.23.226
Under Section 7.24(b), the challenging party has the burden
of proving failure to comply with the above conditions.
Under Section 7.24(c), if the disclosure and legality condi-
tions are satisfied, but the appraisal right condition is not, the
transaction may be challenged on the ground that it constitutes
a waste of corporate assets.
Under Section 7.24(d), the availability of an appraisal rem-
edy does not preclude an action against a director or controlling
shareholder for a violation of the fair dealing provisions of the
Project. The Project explains the rationale of Section 7.24 as
follows: "[I]n the case of a simple arm's length combination, if
shareholders have an appropriate appraisal remedy, a parallel
injunctive proceeding has little additional to offer."27
G. Application to the Time-Warner Transaction of the
Delaware and ALI Arm's Length Merger Rules Regarding
Director Action and Shareholder Voting and Appraisal
Rights
1. Description of the Originally Proposed Time-Warner
Merger
The originally proposed Time-Warner merger was structured
as a reverse subsidiary stock merger, with Time-Sub, a subsid-
iary of Time merging into Warner. 8 Pursuant to the merger,
the shareholders of Warner were to receive in exchange for
their Warner stock (which was to be cancelled) common stock of
22 2 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 7.24(a)(1).
' Id. at § 7.24(a)(2).
22 Id. at § 7.24(a)(3).
22 Id. § 7.24 cmt. a, at 349.
'8 Time-Warner Joint Proxy Statement and Time Prospectus (May 22,
1989).
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Time amounting to approximately 62% of Time's outstanding
stock after the merger, and the common stock of Time-Sub held
by Time was to be converted into Warner stock. Consequently,
upon completion of the transaction (1) the former Warner
shareholders would have owned 62% and the former Time
shareholders would have owned 38% of the parent company,
Time, which would have had its name changed to Time-Warner,
and (2) Warner would have been a subsidiary of the new Time-
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In addition to the above structure, Time and Warner entered
into a Share Exchange Agreement which provided for the issu-
ance by Warner of approximately 10% of its stock to Time in
exchange for approximately 12% of Time's stock. The Share
No. 2:145]
Exchange Agreement would have been triggered upon the hap-
pening of certain events, such as a hostile tender offer by a
third party for either Time or Warner. The purpose of the
Share Exchange Agreement was to deter another party from
attempting to take over either Time or Warner. Thus, the
Share Exchange Agreement was a defensive tactic designed to
lock-up the Time-Warner merger.
2. Required Actions and Standards Governing Actions of
Time's and Warner's Boards of Directors
In the following analysis, each Board's actions will be exam-
ined under Delaware law and then under the ALI Rules. The
same analysis pattern will apply each time the Time-Warner
transaction and the actions of the various parties, including
Boards of Directors and shareholders, are considered.
a. Time's Board
Since the transaction was structured as a reverse subsidiary
merger, Time was not a "constituent" corporation under Section
251 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (relating to mer-
gers),' and consequently, Time's Board was not required
pursuant to that provision to make a recommendation to its
shareholders regarding the merger transaction. However, under
the general duty of management under Section 141(a),"0
Time's Board was required to approve the transaction.
The standard business judgment rule governed the director's
actions, including their actions in entering the lock-up. The
Delaware Supreme Court specifically held in Paramount Com-
munications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.3 1 that Time's board was not
subject to "Revlon duties" 2 in negotiating the merger with
Warner. Consequently, the business judgment rule was appli-
cable. Revlon duties would have applied if the transaction had
229 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
230 DEIL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991).
2' 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
232Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986).
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involved a change of control of Time. In such case, Time would
have been required to "seek the transaction offering the best
value reasonably available to the stockholders." 3 The court
held that Revlon duties would have applied if "in negotiating
with Warner, [Time's board had] made the disolution or break-
up of the corporate entity inevitable, as was the case in
Revlon."'
Other cases, including Crouse Hinds,2 Buffalo Forge 6
and Cottel,"7 have also applied the business judgment rule in
evaluating lock-ups associated with arm's length merger agree-
ments.2 38
Under the ALI rules, the originally proposed Time-Warner
merger would have been a transaction in control under Section
1.38(a) of the Project. The transaction did not come within the
75% continuity exception of Section 1.38(b)(3). Consequently,
under Section 6.01(a), the transaction would have required the
approval of the board of directors of Time. And, as provided in
Section 6.01(a), the business judgment rule of Section 4.01(c)
would have governed the actions of the directors. The Project
does not take a position on the use of lock-ups, such as the
share exchange agreement. 9
b. Warner's Board
Under Delaware law, Warner was a constituent corporation
under Section 251(c) of the Delaware General Corporation Law,
and as a consequence, in order for the merger agreement to be
presented to the Warner shareholders for their consideration,
"' Paramount Comm., Inc. v. Time, In., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
234 Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1150.
Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980).
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983).
Cottle v. Storer Communicaton, Inc., 849 F.2d 570 (11th Cir. 1988).
238 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, reporter's note 8,
at 404.
29 Id. § 6.01 cmt. d, at 393.
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Section 251(b) required that the Warner board affirmatively
approve the transaction.2 °
The actions by the Warner directors were governed by the
business judgment rule as illustrated in the Van Gorkom "
decision. Also, the Share Exchange Agreement was subject to
the business judgment rule.
Under the ALI rules, the transaction would have been a
transaction in control with respect to Warner under Section
1.38(a) of the Project, and as a consequence, approval of the
transaction by the Warner board of directors would have been
required under Section 6.01(a).
Section 6.01(a) provides that the business judgment rule of
Section 4.01(c) applies to the director's action. Thus, the Project
follows the Van Gorkom principles of Delaware law in applying
the business judgment rule to the Warner board.1 2 The Pro-
ject clarifies, however, that there is no requirement for
Warner's directors to determine a single "intrinsic value" as
suggested in Van Gorkom.'
The Project also makes it clear that the target's directors do
not have a duty to auction the company,' and the directors
can give an auction ending lock-up.' Further, the Project
clarifies that the directors may, consistent with the business
judgment rule, reject the offer." 6
3. The Right of Shareholders to Vote
a. Time's Shareholders
Under Delaware law, the Time shareholders did not have a
right to vote because Time was not a constituent corporation
under Section 251(c) of the Delaware General Corporation Law.
2m0 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (Supp. 1994).
241 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).





2 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 7.24 cmt. c(3),
illus. 2, at 356.
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This is because in a triangular merger under Delaware law, the
acquiring parent corporation is not a constituent corporation
under Section 251(c).247 However, the Time shareholders were
given the right to vote pursuant to the New York Stock Ex-
change Rules.' Under these rules, the shareholders of an
acquiring firm have the right to vote if the common stock to be
issued in the transaction will have voting power equal to or in
excess of 20% of the voting power outstanding before the issu-
ance or the number of shares of common stock to be issued in
the transaction is equal to or in excess of 20% of the number of
shares of common stock outstanding before the issuance.2
Under the ALI rules, the proposed merger would have been a
transaction in control under Section 1.38(a) of the Project. The
transaction would not have been excepted under the 75% conti-
nuity test of Section 1.38(b)(3) because the Time shareholders
did not retain a 75% continuity of interest in Time. Their inter-
est would have been diluted from 100% of Time shares to 38%
of Time-Warner shares.
As a consequence of the transaction constituting a transac-
tion in control with respect to Time, the Time shareholders
would have had the right to vote under Section 6.01(b). This
result illustrates the codification by the Project of the de facto
merger doctrine.
b. Warner's Shareholders
Under Section 251(c) of the Delaware General Corporation
Law, Warner was a constituent corporation, and, consequently,
the Warner shareholders had the right to vote.
Under the ALI rules, the merger would have been a transac-
tion in control with respect to Warner under Section 1.38(a) of
the Project, and, therefore, under Section 6.01(b), the Warner
shareholders would have had the right to vote.
2 7 Folk on Delaware, supra note 190, at 17.
New York Stock Exchange Rules, Section 312, (Relating to Shareholder
Approval Policy).
249 Id. at § 312.03(c).
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The Warner shareholders apparently would not have had the
right to vote if they had received 75% or more, rather than
only 62%, of the resulting company, Time-Warner. In such an
event, the 75% continuity of interest exception of Section
1.38(b)(3) would have applied. Clearly, this exception would
have applied if Warner had been the surviving corporation and
the 75% continuity requirement had been satisfied. A close
reading of Section 1.38(b) seems to indicate that the continuity
exception applies both when the acquiror's shareholders satisfy
the 75% continuity test and when the target's shareholders
satisfy that test. The discussion in the Project does not appear
to address this issue.
4. Right of Shareholders to Appraisal
This and succeeding sections focus on the dissenters' rights
provisions of the Project and Delaware law in the context of the
Time-Warner proposed arm's length merger. Section III.G.5
discusses the rules governing the determination of whether the
shareholders were entitled to dissenters' or appraisal rights.
Section III.G.6 addresses whether appraisal would have been
the exclusive remedy, and Section III.G.7 deals with the deter-
rnination of fair value in an appraisal proceeding regarding an
arm's length transaction.
5. Right to Appraisal in Originally Proposed Merger
a. Time's Shareholders
In the originally proposed arm's length merger, a subsidiary
of Time was going to merge into Warner with the common
shareholders of Warner receiving 62% of the stock of Time. 250
No vote was required under Delaware law by the Time
shareholders, even though they would have owned only 38% of
the surviving corporation. This was because Time was not a
constituent corporation as specified in Section 251(c) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law."' Since Time was not a
2o See supra Part III.G.1.
"1 Folk on Delaware, supra note 190, at 17.
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constituent corporation, the shareholders of Time did not have
appraisal rights under Section 262 of the Delaware General
Corporation Law.
If Warner had merged directly into Time, Time would have
been a constituent corporation under Section 251(c), and the
Time shareholders would have had the right to vote. Time also
would have been a constituent corporation under Section 262(b)
of the Delaware General Corporation Law, and but for the fact
that Time's shares were listed on a stock exchange and, there-
fore, excluded from appraisal by Section 262(b)(1), Time's share-
holders also would have had the right to appraisal. The New
York Stock Exchange rules did, however, require a vote of the
Time shareholders, but a right of appraisal under Delaware law
did not follow this right to vote. 2
Since the shareholders of Time ended up with less than 60%
of the surviving firm, the shareholders of Time would have
been given appraisal rights under Section 7.21(a) of the Project.
There is no market exception to the appraisal right under
the Project.
b. Warner's Shareholders
On the Warner side of the transaction, Warner was a constit-
uent corporation under Section 251(c) of the Delaware General
Corporation Law, and, consequently, its shareholders had the
right to vote. Also, the shareholders would have had the right
to dissent under Section 262 but for the market exception un-
der Section 262(b). Under this exception, since the Warner
shares were traded on the New York Stock Exchange and they
were being exchanged for Time shares that were going to be
traded on that exchange, the Warner shareholders were not
given appraisal rights.
In the originally proposed merger, the Warner shareholders
apparently would not have had an appraisal right under Sec-
tion 7.21(a) of the Project. This is because the Warner share-
holders would have owned at least 60% of the stock of the
2 See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
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surviving corporation.25 Clearly, if Warner had been the ac-
quiring corporation, the Warner shareholders would not have
had appraisal rights because they would have continued to own
at least 60% of Warner.
6. Exclusivity of Appraisal Proceedings in Originally
Proposed Merger
a. Time's Shareholders
As indicated in Part III.G.5.a, the shareholders of Time did
not have the right of appraisal in the originally proposed mer-
ger because Time was not a constituent corporation under Sec-
tion 262(b) of the Delaware General Corporation Law.
Presumably, under the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in
Weinberger, if the Time shareholders had appraisal rights in
that transaction, appraisal would have been the exclusive rem-
edy because there was no "fraud, misrepresentation, self-
dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or gross palpable
overreaching ... ."4 Thus, in the originally proposed merger,
the shareholders of Time had no appraisal rights and also had
no other rights enabling them to challenge the transaction.
However, as indicated in Part III.G.5.a, under Section 7.21 of
the Project, Time's shareholders would have had appraisal
rights in the originally proposed merger.
Under Section 7.24 of the Project, appraisal would have been
the exclusive remedy for the Time shareholders in the original-
ly proposed merger because the transaction was not a minority-
controlled freezeout subject to Section 5.10, a management
buyout subject to Section 5.15, or a majority controlled freeze-
out subject to Section 7.25. This conclusion is predicated on the
assumption that none of the directors or executive officers of
Time had an "interest" in the transaction so as to cause the
transaction to be subject to the management buyout rules of
Section 5.15." The mere payment of a post acquisition salary
See infra Part III.F.2.
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983). See also Cede &
Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
2-' See infra Part IV.
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to an executive of either Time or Warner would not in and of
itself cause the transaction to fall within Section 5.15.256 This
point is made by the following illustration from the Project:
A, who is the chief executive officer of X Corporation, is ap-
proached by Y Corporation with a proposal that Y Corporation
acquire X Corporation by a merger in which Y Corporation will
issue two shares of its common stock for each outstanding share
of X Corporation common stock. The relationship between the
parties is not such that the merger would be subject to § 5.10,
§ 5.15, or § 7.25. Y Corporation indicates that it intends to enter
into an employment contract substantially increasing A's rate of
compensation following the acquisition. If these facts are dis-
closed to the board and the shareholders and the transaction
otherwise satisfies the requirements of § 7.24(a)(1)-(3), the trans-
action is not subject to being set aside.1
7
The conclusion reached in the above illustration would not
apply in the Time-Warner acquisition if an executive officer or
director of Time had received an investment interest in the
surviving company (other than an investment interest received
in the capacity of a shareholder and on the same basis as other
shareholders). In such case, such an investment interest would
constitute an interest for purposes of Section 5.15 and would
cause the transaction to be a management buyout in which
case appraisal would not be the exclusive remedy.
The Project also contains an illustration, based on the Van
Gorkom decision, that demonstrates that even in a situation
where the directors breach their duty of care and are not pro-
tected by the business judgment rule, appraisal is the exclusive
remedy. s
256 I&.
27 2 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 7.24 cmt. c(3),
illus. 2, at 355-56.
25 Id. illus. 3, at 356-57.
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b. Warner's Shareholders
As indicated in Section III.G.5.b, the Warner common share-
holders did not have appraisal rights in the originally proposed
merger because of the market exception in Section 262(b)(1) of
the Delaware General Corporation Law. Under the Weinberger
fraud, etc. standard, appraisal was apparently the only remedy,
and, therefore, the Warner shareholders could not otherwise
have challenged the merger.
As indicated in Section III.G.5.b, Warner shareholders appar-
ently would not have had appraisal rights under Section 7.21 of
the Project because they would have satisfied the 60% continu-
ity test. Also, under Section 7.24, they would have had no other
rights to challenge the merger because appraisal is the exclu-
sive remedy.
7. Determining Fair Value of Shares in Originally Proposed
Merger
As indicated above, neither the Warner shareholders nor the
Time shareholders had appraisal rights under Delaware law in
the originally proposed merger. However, if appraisal rights had
been granted the appraisal court would have taken into account
all relevant factors in determining the value of the shares in-
cluding modern valuation techniques, such as the discounted
cash flow model."
Section 7.22 of the Project sets out the rules regarding deter-
mination of the fair value of shares in an appraisal proceeding.
Section 7.22(a) provides that "fair value should be determined
using the customary evaluation concepts and techniques gener-
ally employed in the relevant securities and financial markets
for similar businesses in the context of the transaction giving
rise to appraisal."26° Thus, the standard applied here is essen-
tially the same as the Weinberger test of fair value.
Section 7.22(b) provides, however, that in an arm's length
transaction, the "aggregate price accepted by the board of direc-
tors of the subject corporation should be presumed to represent
"9 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
260 2 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 7.22(a).
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the fair value of the corporation . . ., unless the plaintiff can
prove otherwise by clear and convincing evidence."26'
In the Time-Warner transaction, the shareholders of Time,
but not the shareholders of Warner, would have had appraisal
rights under the ALI rules. Since the transaction was arm's
length, the value determined by Time's board would presump-
tively be the fair market value of the Time stock, unless a
plaintiff could prove otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.
Presumably in the Time-Warner transaction this clear and
convincing standard could not have been met. Thus, as a prac-
tical matter, even though the shareholders of Time would have
been given appraisal rights, the shareholders would probably
have been unsuccessful in establishing that the shares were in
fact more valuable than that determined by the board of direc-
tors.
H. Observations
In Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc.,"2 the
Supreme Court of Delaware confirmed that a target's board
that negotiates a stock for stock merger with the acquiror is
not required to auction the target under "Revlon duties.""
Consequently, the business judgment rule applies. The court
concluded that Revlon's "enhanced scrutiny" did not apply be-
cause there was "no 'sale of or change in control' when '[clontrol
of both [companies] remain[s] in a large, fluid, changeable and
changing market.'"2 This is true even though the sharehold-
ers of the target were "relegated to minority status in [the
acquiror] .... 2." Arnold, in essence, confirms the holding of
the Delaware Supreme Court in Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. Time, Inc.266 to the effect that Revlon duties did not
apply to the originally negotiated merger.
261 Id. § 7.22(b).
262 650 K2d 1270 (Del. 1994).
26 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986).2
6 Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1290.
2 6
5 Id.
216 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
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Even though under the ALI rules, dissenting shareholders
are given an appraisal right in arm's length mergers and acqui-
sitions, as a practical matter the appraisal proceeding is unlike-
ly to produce a price that is higher than the price paid in the
transaction. Therefore, appraisal proceedings in arm's length
transactions would be rare under the ALI rules.
IV. MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS
A. Introduction
Section 5.15 deals with transactions in control26 and ten-
der offers in which a director or principal senior executive
(director/executive) is "interested." Thus, Section 5.15 addresses
management buyouts; that is, transactions in which the manag-
ers of the target are involved in gaining control of a target
corporation by taking an equity position in the surviving corpo-
ration and, therefore, are "interested" in the transaction.
The term "interested" is defined in Section 1.23(a)(2) to mean
"a business, financial, or familial relationship with a party to
the transaction or conduct, and that relationship would reason-
ably be expected to affect the director's or officer's judgment
with respect to the transaction or conduct in a manner adverse
to the corporation."2  "Interest" does not include, however,
"employment contracts, stock options, or other normal manage-
ment remuneration incentives to continue employment with the
successor corporation .... " 2 9 However, the receipt of a "sub-
stantial severance payment as a condition to action or inaction"
could cause a director or officer to be interested in the transac-
tion.
27 0
Directors or executives who resign from the target "prior to
or simultaneously with the time at which they present to the
corporation's board of directors their proposal for acquiring its
business" are not interested.2  If a proposal by directors/
'- See supra Part II.B.
1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 1.23(a)(2).
269 Id. § 5.15 cmt. c(1), at 364.
270 Id. § 6.01 cmt. e(2), at 397.
271 Id. § 5.15 cmt. c(1), at 364.
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executives is made in response to a third party's proposal, the
directors/executives are still interested.2
One study of management buyouts indicates that the equity
position of management rose from an average of 6.5% in the
target to an average of 24.3% in the acquiring entity." Many
of these transactions are structured as leveraged buyouts,
which are acquisitions in which most of the acquisition consid-
eration is borrowed;" however, by its terms, Section 5.15 is
not limited to leveraged transactions and may, indeed, apply to
a stock for stock merger.
Section 5.15(a) provides that if the directors/executives of a
target are interested in a transaction in control or a tender
offer that results in a transfer of control of the target to anoth-
er person, then the interested directors/executives have the
burden of proving that the transaction is fair to the target's
shareholders. Fairness can be established by showing that the
price paid is within a "range of reasonableness."7 5 This proof
of fairness standard does not apply if the transfer involves a
transfer by a controlling shareholder27 6 or the conditions of
Section 5.15(b) are satisfied.
Section 5.15(b) provides a method for both shifting the bur-
den of proof to the party challenging the transaction and
heightening the standard of proof. The challenging party must
prove that the terms of the transaction are equivalent to a
waste of corporate assets. This provision only applies to trans-
actions in control involving publicly held corporations. Section
1.42 defines the term waste of corporate assets to mean either
[1] an expenditure of corporate funds or a disposition of corporate
assets for which no consideration is received in exchange and for
which there is no rational business purpose, or [21 if consider-
ation is received in exchange, the consideration the corporation
receives is so inadequate in value that no person of ordinary
Id. cmt. c(3), at 367.
273 Id. cmt. c(1), at 362.
24 Id. at 361.
27' Id. cmt. c(2), at 365.
2 See infra Part VI.
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sound business judgment would deem it worth that which the
corporation has paid.2"
Thus, if the interested directors/executives successfully comply
with Section 5.15(b), the challenging party has the burden of
showing that the transaction was a waste of corporate assets,
which is a much heavier burden than merely showing that the
transaction was unfair.
To shift the burden to the challenging party and heighten
the proof standard under Section 5.15(b), the following four
conditions must be satisfied:
(1) Public disclosure of the proposed transaction [must be]
made;
(2) Responsible persons who express an interest [(i.e., potential
acquirors) must be] provided with relevant information concern-
ing [the target] and given a reasonable opportunity to submit a
competing proposal;
(3) [After complying with (1) and (2),] the transaction [must
be] authorized by disinterested directors . . .; and
(4) [After disclosure of (1) the interested directors'/executives'
conflict of interest" 8, and (2) the transaction,"'] the trans-
action [must be] authorized or ratified by disinterested sharehold-
ers . . . (or, if the transaction is effected by a tender offer, the
offer [must be] accepted by disinterested shareholders) .... 28
Section 5.15 does not cover a transaction in which the direc-
tors/executives simply sell a business to an acquiring corpora-
tion or purchase from a corporation a division or subsidiary.
Such transactions are not transactions in control and, therefore,
the normal rules in Part V of the Project regarding fair dealing
apply to such transactions.28 '
The Project explains that the purpose of the provisions in
Section 5.15(b) is to "allow the market to operate as the prima-
ry check on the fairness of a management buyout."2 The qual-
277 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 1.42.
" See id. § 1.14(a).
29 See id. § 1.14(b).
m8 Id. § 5.15(b) (emphasis added).
281 Id. § 5.15 cmt. c(1), at 364.
282Id. cmt. b, at 360.
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ity and timing of the required disclosure is dependent on the
realistic needs of potential bidders. Such bidders should be
given access to "the same character [of information] as that
provided to [the] investment banker representing any party to
the transaction."2" Also, the reasonableness of the response
time will be a function of the complexity of the transaction.2"
The interested directors/executives are not required to disclose
the highest price they are willing to pay.2"
Under Section 5.15(b)(3), it is contemplated that disinterested
directors will act as an independent negotiating committee on
behalf of the target and that they will select their investment
banker and other advisers without the participation of the in-
terested directors/executives.8 6
The Project does not appear to directly address the standard
to be applied in determining whether the directors have satis-
fied the approval requirements of Section 5.15(b)(3). Presum-
ably, the business judgment rule would apply in making this
determination.
The Project indicates that under existing law, although man-
agement buyouts "have not been explicitly treated as interested
transactions that would explicitly trigger a full-scale fairness
review, . . .disinterested director approval of such transactions
[is] not being accorded the full protection of the business judg-
ment rule." 7
The problem that Section 5.15 addresses is "to identify gover-
nance rules that provide reasonable assurance that the division
of the gain resulting from the management buyout transaction
approximates that which would be forthcoming in an arm's
length transaction."' The Project says that in a management
buyout, the market for corporate control can potentially police
the fairness of the transaction.289 For this reason, Section
5.15(b)(2) requires that responsible potential bidders be given
283 Id. cmt. c(3), at 366-67.
281 Id. at 367.
2' Id. at 368.
2
W6 Id.
217 Id. cmt. a(2), at 361.
m Id. cmt. c(1), at 362.
289 Id.
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access to relevant information and be given reasonable opportu-
nity to bid. This is not the case, however, in a freezeout trans-
action in which the target is taken over by a controlling share-
holder.29 Consequently, Section 7.25, which deals with major-
ity-control freezeouts, "places primary reliance on a combination
of an independent bargaining structure and the presence of an
adequate appraisal remedy." 9'
The Project goes on to say that "[blecause a transaction that
satisfies the requirements of Section 5.15(b) will have been
tested by the market, judicial review is limited to a waste stan-
dard."292 This is because Section 5.15(b) is "intended to facili-
tate alternative proposals for an acquisition of the corporation
as a means to police the fairness of a proposed management
buyout." 93 The disclosure and market review provisions of
Section 5.15(b) are explored in greater detail in Section IV.B
below, and the rules regarding appraisal are examined in Sec-
tion IV.C.
B. The Disclosure and Market Review Requirements of
Section 5.15(b)
The Project says that Section 5.15(b) "reflects two basic pre-
mises."2 4 First, a market test of the fairness of a manage-
ment buyout is preferable to judicial review. Second, in
order to provide a meaningful market test, there must be a re-
duction in the disadvantages under which potential competitive
bidders operate.296 Section 5.15(b) applies only to publicly
held corporations because, generally, the opportunity for a mar-
ket review of the fairness of a transaction is less likely for
closely-held corporations. 97
-o Id. See infra Part VII.C.
291 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 5.15 cmt. c(1).
292 Id.
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If the market test provisions of Section 5.15(b) apply, court
review is limited to determining whether the transaction results
in a waste of corporate assets.
The Project explains that Section 5.15(b) sets out "three
transactional requirements" 28 that must be satisfied. First, as
provided in Section 5.15(b)(1), the proposed transaction must be
publicly disclosed. Second, as provided in Section 5.15(b)(2),
responsible, potential bidders must be provided with the rele-
vant information concerning the target. Third, as provided in
Section 5.15(b)(2), potential bidders must be given a reasonable
opportunity to evaluate the information and to prepare a com-
peting bid. In addition to these transactional requirements, the
transaction must be approved by both the disinterested direc-
tors299 and the disinterested shareholders.0 0
The purpose of these three transactional requirements is to
reduce the informational and timing disadvantages third party
bidders "otherwise suffer in attempting to compete with a pro-
posed transaction in control sponsored by corporate insid-
ers."
301
Since the purpose of the disclosure requirement is "to alert
the market to the opportunity to make a competitive proposal
and to the terms against which bidding will take place .. ., the
quality and timing of disclosure required under § 5.15(b) is to
be judged from the perspective of the needs of a potential com-
petitive bidder sophisticated enough to contemplate a corporate
acquisition."0 2 Management is not, however, required to dis-
close their highest possible price. O
Potential bidders are to be provided the same type of infor-
mation as is normally provided to investment bankers repre-
senting a party to the transaction.'" The target can insist on
29 Id. at 366.
See id. § 5.15(b)(3).
" See id. § 5.15(b)(4).
301 Id. cmt. c(3), at 366.
302 Id. at 366.
:'0 Id. § 5.15 cmt. c(3), at 368.
304 Id. at 366-67.
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the receipt of a confidentiality agreement as a condition to
release of the information.3 0 5
Satisfaction of the requirement that potential bidders be
given a reasonable time to respond is dependent upon the size
and complexity of both the target and the transaction proposed
by management."0 6
Under Section 5.15(b)(3), it is contemplated that disinterested
directors will supervise the negotiation of any agreement and
the conduct of any auction in which the interested directors/
executives are involved.0 7 Also, disinterested directors should
choose their own legal advisers and investment bankers, with-
out the participation of the interested directors/executives.
0 8
Disinterested directors should determine all aspects of the
bidding or auction process, such as whether sealed bids are
required.31 Such process is not, however, to favor the inter-
ested directors/executives.3 0
Since under Section 6.01(a) the directors can approve, reject
or decline to consider an acquisition proposal, the directors will
not be liable for loss of a bid submitted on unacceptable condi-
tions, such as a short response period or a demand for prefer-
ential treatment.3 1
Furthermore, in selecting between competing bids, the direc-
tors may accept a bid that "accommodates the factors set forth
in § 6.02(a) [relating to actions by a target's directors that has
the foreseeable effect of blocking a tender offer], so long as the
bid that is accepted is not materially less favorable to the inter-
est of [the] shareholders."" This materially less favorable
concept is similar to a concept that applies to defensive tactics
in tender offers under Section 6.02.8i s
Disinterested directors can first enter into an acquisition
agreement with interested directors/executives and then satisfy
305 Id. at 367.
306 id.
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313 See infra Part V.
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the conditions of Section 5.15(b) provided the disinterested
directors remain free to terminate the agreement with the in-
terested directors/executives and enter into an agreement with
a competing bidder. 14 Normally, prior to the end of the mar-
ket test period, disinterested directors cannot grant a lock-up to
the interested directors/executives.1 However, if the disinter-
ested directors have satisfied the conditions of Section 5.15(b)
by conducting a fair auction and during the auction the disin-
terested directors have announced their intention to grant an
auction-ending lock-up to the successful bidder, then a reason-
able lock-up could be granted to the interested directors/
executives if their bid was accepted.
316
The Project gives as an example of an acceptable lock-up an
"option to acquire important assets of the corporation if the
corporation were acquired by a third party within twelve
months."31 The Project goes on to explain:
[A] lock-up option might appropriately operate to protect the
successful bidder from a subsequent competing bid for a reason-
able period of time, but it should not constrain the opportunity of
target shareholders to reject the successful bidder's proposal, so
long as the target's shareholders do not then accept a competing
bid within such reasonable period of time.31
Also, the limitation on lock-ups does not extend to a commit-
ment made to all bidders to reimburse the reasonable expenses
of the successful bidder or to pay a reasonable incentive or
topping fee.31
The Project says that although the adoption of the market
test rule in Section 5.15(b) may have the effect of restricting
the number of management buyouts, this detriment is out-
314 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANcE PROJEcT, supra note 1, § 5.15 cmt. c(3),
at 369.
315 Id. (citing Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F. 2d
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weighed by higher prices paid to the target's shareholders.3 20
The Project explains: "Consistent with corporate law's tradition-
al treatment of interested transactions, § 5.15 reflects a conclu-
sion that shareholders are generally better off when the terms
of interested transactions are reviewed, even at the risk that
the number of such transactions will be reduced."3 2'
The Reporter's Notes indicate that courts have given "special
oversight" to transactions in which control is shifted to direc-
tors/executives by way of a corporate repurchase of its shares or
a recapitalization.3 2 Without saying whether such trans-
actions are within the scope of Section 5.15(a), the Reporter's
Notes say that the market test rules of Section 5.15(b)(1)-(3)
are "intended to provide that oversight through market forces
with a minimum of judicial intervention."3"
C. Appraisal Rights in Management Buyouts
1. Management Buyouts as Transactions in Control Giving
Rise to Appraisal Rights
As indicated in Section III.F.2, Section 7.21(a) provides that
a shareholder should be entitled to appraisal rights in various
types of mergers and acquisitions, unless the shareholders of
the target or acquiring corporation own proportionately at least
60% of the stock of the acquiring corporation after the transac-
tion.32
Also, under Section 7.21(c)(2), appraisal rights arise in a sale
of substantial assets that leaves the target without a significant
continuing business, unless the sale is in the ordinary course or
is for cash or cash equivalents and the target is liquidated.3"
Thus, for example, if a management buyout is effectuated as a
merger in which the 60% continuity test is not satisfied (which
320 Id.
321 id.
" Id. reporter's note 1, at 373, (citing Black & Decker Corp. v. American
Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1988) and Mills Acquisition Co. v.
MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989)).
323 Id.
32 2 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 7.21(a).
32 Id. § 7.21(c).
[Vol. 1996
would normally be the case) or as a sale of all of a target's
assets for something other than cash, the target's shareholders
will have appraisal rights.
Also, under Section 7.21(c)(1), a target's shareholders would
have appraisal rights in a transaction that falls within the
management buyout rules of Section 5.15(a) and which involves
a sale of assets accounting for a majority of the corporation's
earnings or total assets, unless the market test rules of Section
5.15(b) are satisfied and the target is publicly traded.
The Project explains the rules of Section 7.21(c)(1) as follows:
Under the final clause of § 7.21(c)(1), appraisal rights do not
arise, even in the case of a management buyout effected through
a sale of assets, if the auction procedures specified in § 5.15(b)
are followed. In these circumstances, the judgment expressed in
§ 7.21(c)(1) is that compliance with § 5.15(b) substantially miti-
gates the conflict of interest problem. Given that § 5.15(b) sup-
plies an adequate market test, there is no need to extend a judi-
cial remedy through appraisal when this test is satisfied.326
The Project gives as an illustration of the above rules a situ-
ation in which senior management of a public target corpora-
tion become significant shareholders of an acquiror that ac-
quires 70% of the target's assets in an LBO. The example holds
that since the transaction is governed by Section 5.15, a right
of appraisal arises under Section 7.21(c)(1) "regardless of whe-
ther the remaining assets of the corporation constitute a 'signif-
icant continuing business," unless the market test rules of
Section 5.15(b)(1)-(3) are satisfied.327
The market test exception to the appraisal right in manage-
ment buyouts apparently does not apply to such transactions
that are effectuated as mergers under Section 7.21(a) or as
sales of all (or substantially all) of the target's assets in a
transaction in which the target fails to continue a significant
line of business as specified in Section 7.21(c)(2). The exception
on its face only applies under Section 7.21(c)(1) to a sale of a
majority of the target's assets in a situation in which the target
m Id. § 7.21 cmt. c(3), at 306.
327Id. illus. 3, at 308.
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continues a significant business. Thus, the market exception
would apply in narrow circumstances.
2. Determining Fair Value in Interested Party Transactions
Like MBOs
Section 7.22(c) provides that in an interested party acquisi-
tion, which includes management buyouts under Section 5.15,
non-majority control freezeouts under Section 5.10,"'9 and
majority control freezeouts under Section 7.25," the "court
generally should give substantial weight to the highest realistic
price that a willing, able, and fully informed buyer would pay
for the corporation as an entirety."33 In making such deter-
mination the court can, unless it would be unreasonable to do
so, "include a proportionate share of any gain reasonably to be
expected to result from the combination."33'
The Project explains that Section 7.22(c) does not require
that fair market value be determined by the "presumed out-
come of a hypothetical competitive auction."332 Further, the
Project says that in self interested transactions under Sections
5.10, 5.15 and 7.25 the "court generally should not average
alternative valuation measures, but instead should value the
"333property at its most efficient use ....
The Project indicates that in a parent-subsidiary transaction
under Section 7.25 in which the parent has held the subsid-
iary's stock for a substantial period, there may be a sound
justification for departing from an auction standard, because a
third party bidder could not prevail with an offer over the par-
ent's objection.3" The same is not true in management buy-
outs under Section 5.15 and non-majority control transactions
under Section 5.10.
The Project points out that in interested party transactions
governed by Section 7.22(c), it must be "recognized that many
328 See infra Part VII.B.
See infra Part VII.C.
'30 2 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 7.22(c).
331 Id.
"32 Id. § 7.22 cmt. d, at 320.
"' Id. cmt. c, at 316.
"3'Id. cmt. d, at 321.
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firms trade at a market value that is well below their liquida-
tion or 'asset sale' value""35 and that it would be "fundamen-
tally inconsistent with management's fiduciary responsibilities if
it could acquire a corporation's business for itself based on
either the firm's current market or going concern value when a
third party had offered, or would offer, a higher price." 36 Fail-
ure to require the type of third party valuation called for in
Section 7.22(c) in such situations would "create an incentive for
conduct that is functionally equivalent to insider trading."3 '
The Project does not specify how the third party sales price
is to be determined. It would appear, however, that the price
paid in the transaction would be deemed to satisfy this stan-
dard if the price was determined by a process in which
disinterested directors have in fact negotiated on behalf of the
controlled corporation [or the target in a management buyout] in
an arm's length fashion and appropriate factual investigation
(which may include securing the opinions of qualified experts)
has established substantial objective evidence for the determina-
tion that the consideration offered to the minority shareholders
constitutes fair value for their shares ..... s
Although this statement is made in the context of determin-
ing whether appraisal is the exclusive remedy in a majority
control freezeout governed by Section 7.25, the same princi-
ple should apply in determining fair value in an appraisal pro-
ceeding.
Thus, it would appear that if in an appraisal proceeding
involving a management buyout under Section 5.15, a non-
majority control freezeout under Section 5.10 or a majority
control freezeout under Section 7.25, the merger consideration
is determined through arm's length type bargaining with disin-
terested directors, then the merger consideration should gener-
m Id. at 323 (citing Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting
that a company's appraisers estimated asset values as high as $323, while stock
was trading at $64).
m Id.
37 Id. at 324.
Id. § 7.25 cmt. c(1), at 385.
'3' See supra Part VII.C.2.c.
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ally be found to constitute fair value. As a practical matter, the
use of an independent negotiating structure in these situations
should discourage the use of appraisal proceedings.
On the other hand, the Project contains an example involving
a freezeout transaction in which a parent corporation that owns
50% of the subsidiary's stock acquires the subsidiary's other
shares in a freezeout transaction for $30 per share, $6 above
the trading value of those shares. The value of the sub's shares
using the discounted cash flow technique is $32 per share.
After the merger, a third corporation offered $40 per share for
the sub. The example concludes that "the court should award
dissenting shareholders $40 per share, which represents their
proportionate interest in the [s]ubsidiary valued at the highest
price that a willing and informed buyer would pay."' 0
The Project points out that recent decisions in Delaware and
Maine have rejected the use of minority discounts,3 1 and that
Section 7.22(a) follows this rule by requiring the valuation of
"the firm as whole, not specific shares, and [the] allocat[ion] [of]
that value proportionately, absent extraordinary circumstan-
ces. "34
2
The Project indicates that under Section 7.22(c), synergistic
gains are to be divided proportionately between the acquiror
and the target in determining the value of the target's
shares.' A proportionate allocation of synergistic gains
should not, however, be used if such an allocation would result
in an undeserved windfall.'"
3. Non-Exclusivity of Appraisal Proceedings for Management
Buyouts
Section 5.15(c) provides that even if the target's shareholders
in a management buyout are entitled to an appraisal remedy,
m4 2 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 7.22 cmt. e,
illus. 4, at 328.
341 Id. at 324 (citing Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del.








which will normally be the case,' the appraisal proceeding is
not the exclusive remedy of a shareholder who proposes to
challenge the transaction. If, however, the transaction also falls
within Section 7.25, which involves freezeout transactions in
which a majority shareholder is a party, then appraisal is the
exclusive remedy.
The Project makes it clear that non-exclusivity applies even
if the burden shifting procedures in Section 5.15(b) are fol-
lowed.3 The Project explains:
The shareholders' remedy will normally be to enjoin or rescind
the transaction or to hold the interested directors, principal se-
nior executives, or their associates liable for breach of their duty
of fair dealing. Disinterested directors who approve the transac-
tion will be entitled to the protection of the business judgment
rule so long as they satisfy the requirements of § 4.01(c).'
Even though appraisal is not the exclusive remedy for a
transaction that has been market tested under the provisions of
Section 5.15(b), court review is limited to determining whether
the transaction results in a waste of corporate assets.2 Con-
sequently, this remedy is likely to be of little practical utility to
challenging parties.
D. Application of the ALI MBO Rules of Section 5.15 and
Related Appraisal Rules to the Time-Warner Transaction
1. The Section 5.15 MBO Rules
As indicated in Section III.G, the originally proposed Time-
Warner merger would have been a transaction in control under
Section 1.38(a) of the Project with respect to both Time and
Warner. As a consequence, under Section 5.15(a), if the direc-
tors or principal senior executives of either corporation were
' See supra Part M.0.1.
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"interested" in the transaction (as defined in Section 1.23), then
such directors or principal senior executives would have the
burden of proving that the transaction was fair to the share-
holders unless the market test conditions of Section 5.15(b)
were satisfied.
In the Time-Warner transaction certain directors of both
companies (particularly the Chief Executive Officer of Warner,
Steven Ross) were to receive substantial benefits resulting from
the merger and it is conceivable that such benefits (such as an
investment interest that is disproportionate to the executive's
pre-acquisition stock intereste 9 or long term employment con-
tracts that would not otherwise be available)5 ° would have
caused such directors to be interested in the transaction, there-
by implicating Section 5.15(a). The Project contains the follow-
ing example that clearly indicates that Section 5.15 can apply
to what appears to be an arm's length merger:
XYZ Corp. merges into ABC Corp. at an exchange rate of $60 in
cash per XYZ share. The senior executives of XYZ Corp. receive
long-term employment contracts from ABC Corp., which contracts
significantly increase their compensation over current levels.
Plaintiffs discover that the senior executives of XYZ Corp. re-
buffed two other offers on otherwise equivalent terms of $66 and
$67 in cash from other corporate suitors at about the time they
accepted ABC's merger proposal. These offers did not include
increased compensation or employment contracts for these execu-
tives. Such information, if adequately documented, could consti-
tute clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the
presumption created by § 7.22(b). If the court were so to conclude
and if it finds that the transaction falls under § 5.15 (because a
principal senior executive was interested), it should look to
§ 7.22(c) as its basic valuation standard. If § 5.15 is not applica-
ble, the court should use the valuation standard specified in
§ 7.22(a), but it may give substantial weight thereunder to the
higher prices offered by the other bidders.5 '
349 Id. at 364.
2 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 7.22 cmt. c,
illus. 2, at 317-18.
351 id.
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If the originally proposed Time-Warner merger had been
subject to Section 5.15, the acquisition would probably have
been restructured to satisfy the market test rules of Section
5.15(b) so as to eliminate the burden on the interested directors
of proving that the transaction was fair. Alternatively, the
transaction could have been restructured to ensure that none of
the directors or principal senior executives had an interest in
the transaction.
As indicated above, the market test rule of Section 5.15(b) is
satisfied if each of the following conditions is satisfied:
(1) Public disclosure of the proposed transaction is made;
(2) Responsible persons who express an interest are provided
relevant information concerning the corporation and given a
reasonable opportunity to submit a competing proposal;
(3) The transaction is authorized in advance by disinterested
directors . . . after the procedures set forth in Subsections (1)
and (2) have been complied with; and
(4) The transaction is authorized or ratified by disinterested
shareholders.... 
2
If these conditions are met then the "party challenging the
transaction has the burden of proving that the terms of the
transaction are the equivalent of a waste of corporate as-
sets."3
If Section 5.15 would have been applicable to Time in the
originally proposed Time-Warner merger, and Time had been
put up for auction under the market test rule of Section
5.15(b), then Paramount probably would have been successful in
acquiring Time.
Although Section 5.15 is directed at traditional management
buyouts, this section is written very broadly, and, as a conse-
quence, in any transaction in control and in any tender offer
that results in a transfer of control of the corporation to anoth-
er person, it is necessary to determine whether directors or
principal senior executives are interested as defined in Section
1.23. If they are interested, then Section 5.15 is implicated even
352 1 ALI CORPoRATE GOVERNANCE PROJEcT, supra note 1, § 5.15(b).
= Id.
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if the transaction is an all equity merger as in the case of the
originally proposed Time-Warner merger. This is the case even
though the drafters of the Project apparently did not contem-
plate that the Time-Warner transaction would be subject to
Section 5.15.
2. Right of Appraisal if Originally Proposed Merger were
Tested as a MBO Under Section 5.15
As indicated above, the originally proposed Time-Warner
merger could have constituted a MBO under Section 5.15 of the
Project with respect to either or both Time and Warner if a
director or principal senior executive of the particular corpora-
tion was "interested" in the transaction. The merger between
Time and Warner is a Section 7.21(a) transaction, and as a
consequence, appraisal rights would have applied to Time
shareholders but not to Warner shareholders (because of the
60% continuity test), as explained in Section III.G.5.3"
3. Exclusivity of Appraisal Proceedings if Originally Proposed
Merger were Treated as a MBO Under Section 5.15
If the originally proposed merger were treated as a MBO
under Section 5.15 of the Project, appraisal would not be the
exclusive remedy under Section 7.24. However, if the market
test provisions of Section 5.15(b) were satisfied, then the party
challenging the transaction would have the burden of proving
that the terms of the transaction are equivalent to a "waste of
corporate assets."355
' Also, if the transaction were treated as a MBO with respect to Warner,
then presumably appraisal rights for Warner would have arisen under Section
7.21(c)(1), which deals with a sale of a majority of the assets, even though the
transaction was not structured as a sale of assets, because the economic sub-
stance of a merger is the same as the sale of all of Warner's assets.
However, if the transaction were treated as a MBO for Warner and the rules
of Section 7.21(c)(1) applied, the appraisal remedy would not apply if the mar-
ket test rules of Section 5.15(b)(1) - (3) have been complied with. See 2 ALI
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 7.21(c)(1).
1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 5.15(b).
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Section 5.15(c) makes it clear that appraisal is not the exclu-
sive remedy in a management buyout unless the transaction
also falls under the majority controlled freezeout rule in Section
7.25 of the Project. Thus, although appraisal is not the exclu-
sive remedy for a MBO if the market test rules are satisfied, as
a practical matter the challenging party has no rights to chal-
lenge the transaction because it is inconceivable that the mar-
ket test rules could have been satisfied and the transaction
could also constitute a "waste of corporate assets."
4. Determining Fair Value of Shares in Appraisal Proceeding
if Originally Proposed Merger were Treated as a MBO
Under Section 5.15
If the originally proposed merger had been treated as a MBO
and the market test rules of Section 5.15(b) were satisfied, then
a challenging party could challenge the transaction on the basis
of waste of assets. As indicated above, if the market test is
satisfied it is highly unlikely that the challenging party could
establish a waste of assets. Thus, the challenging party's only
effective remedy is appraisal, notwithstanding the fact that
appraisal is not the exclusive remedy. Section 7.22(c) provides
that in a management buyout under Section 5.15 the appraisal
court should "give substantial weight to the highest realistic
price that a willing, able and fully informed buyer would pay
for the corporation as an entirety.3 5 6 Thus, the Project points
out that in this type of transaction the shareholders are enti-
tled to auction or liquidation value. However, since under Sec-
tion 5.15(b)(3), disinterested directors must approve the market
tested transaction, it would appear that an appraisal proceeding
would find that the consideration paid in the transaction consti-
tutes fair value for the shares. Consequently, if a transaction
falls within Section 5.15(b), appraisal proceedings should be
rare.
3,62 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 7.22(c). See
also id. § 7.22 cmt. c, illus. 2, at 317-18 and supra Part llI.G.7.
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E. Observation
Section 5.15 has a broad sweep; it is not limited to the tradi-
tional type of management buyout. It could apply even in an all
equity merger like the originally proposed Time-Warner merger
if the target's executives or directors are interested in the
transaction. It could be expected that if the principles of Sec-
tion 5.15 are adopted many transactions that are currently
thought to be arm's length mergers and acquisitions would be
put to the market review test of Section 5.15(b).
V. ACTION BY TARGET'S DIRECTORS THAT HAS THE FORSEEABLE
EFFECT OF BLOCKING AN UNSOLICITED TENDER OFFER
A. In General
Section 6.02(a), which applies only to publicly held corpora-
tions, governs the actions of a target's directors in defending
against a tender offer by an unwanted acquiror for the stock of
the target. Under Section 6.02(a), a target's board "may take an
action that has the foreseeable effect of blocking an unsolicited
tender offer, if the action is a reasonable response to the
offer."3 5 7  Section 5.15, which governs management buy-
outs, 8 ' and not Section 6.02, applies if the directors of the
target have an interest in the acquiring entity."9
Section 6.02(b) provides that in determining whether its
action is a reasonable response to the offer, the board may take
into account "all factors relevant to the best interests of the
corporation and [its] shareholders .... "' Such factors in-
clude the issue of whether the offer is legal and whether the
offer would, if successful "threaten the corporation's essential
economic prospects." 8' In addition, the board may give con-
sideration to the interests of non-shareholder groups for which
the corporation has a "legitimate concern if to do so would not
,57 1 ALI CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE PROJEcT, supra note 1, § 6.02(a).
See supra Part IV.
1 ALl CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJEcT, supra note 1, § 6.02 cmt. a, at
408.
360 Id. § 6.02(b)(1).
361 Id.
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significantly disfavor the long-term interests of share-
holders." 3 2 Thus, to a limited extent the interests of other
constituencies may be considered. The Project says that most of
the statutes authorizing a target's directors to take into consid-
eration the impact on constituencies other than share-
holders" can be interpreted in a manner consistent with Sec-
tion 6.02.
The Project says that the use of the term "best interest" is to
"negat[e] any notion that the only important criterion is wheth-
er an immediate premium over market price is offered." 5 Al-
though the appropriate economic criterion is one that examines
the long-term benefits, "[i]n some cases, long-term benefits are
likely to be greater by taking an immediate profit."366 Other
factors that may be taken into account include the nature,
timing and adequacy of the offer and the risk that the offer
will not be consummated. 3" A significant premium is only
one of the factors to be considered.36 •
The Project explains that the non-shareholder interests and
groups that may be considered include "environmental and
other community concerns, and may include groups, such as
employees, suppliers, and customers."369
The Reporter's Notes say that the formulation in Section
6.02(b)(2) goes beyond the traditional law in Delaware concern-
ing the authority to consider other constituencies. 3Y0 This Del-
aware standard, which is the prevailing standard, allows direc-
tors to give consideration to the interests of others but "compel
them to find some reasonable relationship to the long-term
interests of shareholders when doing so."3
1'
312 Id. § 6.02(b)(2).
363 See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715 (1995).
36 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 6.02 cmt. a, at
410.




36 Id. at 413-14.
3'9 Id. at 414.
370 Id. reporter's note 2, at 427-28.
371 Id. (quoting American Bar Association, Committee on Corporate Laws,
Other Constitutiencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 Bus. LAW. 2253,
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Under Section 6.02(c), the person who asserts that an action
of directors fails to satisfy the standards of Section 6.02(a) has
the "burden of proof that the board's action is an unreasonable
response to the offer."372 Thus, as discussed more fully in Sec-
tion V.B below, the Project rejects the Unocal principle which
puts the burden of proof on the directors taking the defensive
action.
Under Section 6.02(d), an action that does not satisfy the
standards of Section 6.02(a) may be enjoined or set aside, but
the directors who authorize such action may not be held per-
sonally liable for damages if their conduct satisfies the stan-
dards of the business judgment rule under Section 4.01(c).
373
To come within the business judgment rule, the director must
act in good faith, must not be interested in the transaction,
must be informed concerning the action to the extent the direc-
tor reasonably believes is appropriate under the circumstances,
and must rationally believe that the action is in the best inter-
est of the corporation.
Directors should not be considered as interested "solely be-
cause of the prospective loss of usual and customary directors'
fees and perquisites . . . ."" Also, a director's position as a
shareholder should not cause him or her to be considered inter-
ested as long as no special treatment is received. 75 On the
other hand, the potential loss of a position as a senior executive
would be considered a disabling interest.7 6
Section 6.02(d) contemplates that a blocking action taken by
a target's disinterested directors may not be a reasonable re-
sponse to an offer as required by Section 6.02, but may still
satisfy the business judgment rule of Section 4.01(c).
2260-61, 2269 (1990)).
'7 Id. § 6.02(c).
'7' See supra Part II.C.





B. Rejection of Unocal's Allocation of the Burden of Proof
Section 6.02 should be compared with the principle in Unocal
v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 7 There the court held that if a tar-
get's directors take action to block an unsolicited tender offer,
the directors have the burden of proving that they had reason-
able grounds for believing that the offer posed a danger to
corporate policy and effectiveness and that their blocking action
was reasonable in relation to the threat posed."' The burden
of showing reasonable grounds for believing a danger to corpo-
rate policy is satisfied by a showing of good faith and reason-
able investigation.379 If the directors satisfy this two pronged
burden, then they are given protection under the business judg-
ment rule.380
The Project points out that this Unocal principle has been
referred to by courts as an "intermediate" or "enhanced busi-
ness judgment standard of review."38 ' This standard lies be-
tween the normal business judgment rule and the entire fair-
ness test that can apply in certain interested party transac-
tions.
The Project says that Section 6.02 is "intended to be consis-
tent with the so-called Unocal test."82 The Project goes on to
note, however, that whereas the directors have the burden
under Unocal, under Section 6.02, the challenging party has the
burden of proving that the director's blocking action was unrea-
sonable." This is a major difference.
The Project says that Section 6.02 rejects the view found in
certain cases, such as Norlin Corp. v. Rooney Pace, Inc.3' and
" 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
.78 1 ALI CORPORATE GOvERNANCE PROJEcT, supra note 1, § 6.02 cmt. a, at
406 (citing in addition to Unocal, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hold-
ings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) and AC Acquisition Corp. v. Anderson,
Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986)).
.7-4 Id at 407.
"
0 Id.
331 Id. at 406.
2 
d.
" Id. at 407
3" 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984).
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Cheff v. Mathes,3" that judicial review of the blocking actions
of a target's board should be based on a duty of loyalty analy-
sis."86 The Project points out that under this approach if "dir-
ectors' blocking actions suggest that the directors' motive was
retention of control, the business judgment rule is inapplicable
and the action of the directors . . . is subject to review under a
duty of loyalty standard, with the burden on the directors to
prove the fairness of their actions.""' Review under the duty
of loyalty, the Project argues, "cannot effectively distinguish
between cases in which directors favored themselves and cases
in which directors properly looked to the interest of the share-
holders.""a
The Project points out that Section 6.02(a) does not call for
analyzing the subjective intent or motives of directors but rath-
er imposes an objective standard for determining first whether
an action had the foreseeable effect of blocking a tender offer
and if so, then whether such action was reasonable. 89
C. Effect on Control Share, Business Combination and
Similar Statutes
The Project points out that states have adopted a variety of
provisions dealing with hostile offers,39° including (1) statutes
that require or permit directors to consider long-term as well as
short-term interests of the corporation and the share-
holders;39' (2) control share acquisition statutes that can deny
a controlling shareholder the right to vote; 392 (3) fair price
statutes that require that the price paid in a second-step trans-
action be the same as the price paid in the first-step;39 3 (4)
-5 199 A-2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964).
1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJEcT, supra note 1, § 6.02 cmt. a, at
407-08.
m8 Id. at 407.
388 Id. at 408.
3 9 Id.
3'o Id. at 410-11.
391 See IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(g) (1995).
392 See id. § 23-1-42-1 to -11.
393 See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS & ASSNS § 3-601 to -603 (1993 & Supp.
1995).
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business combination statutes that prevent for a specified peri-
od the consummation of a second-step merger in certain circum-
stances;"' and (5) disgorgement statutes that require control-
ling shareholders to disgorge profits made after an unsuccessful
takeover attempt.
39 5
The Project says that some of these statutes give the direc-
tors the discretion to render the statute inapplicable, or to
otherwise affect the operation of the statute. Section 6.02, how-
ever, takes no position regarding the standard of review appli-
cable to the exercise of such discretion.39 6 The Reporter's
Notes say that operation under these statutes is to be governed
by "statutory interpretation[s] as applied to the particular stat-
ute."
3 97
D. Comparison of the Section 6.02 Standard with the
Business Judgment Rule
In setting out the rationales behind Section 6.02, the Project
says that since shareholders normally have the right to sell
their shares without restriction, a blocking action by the board
goes far beyond the normal board function of conducting the
corporation's business and requires a special justification.398 It
is not sufficient to judge such actions by the business judgment
rule or the duty of loyalty or fair dealing. Rather, such actions
should be
judged according to whether the action is a reasonable response
to the offer, taking into account the factors set out in § 602(b)(1)
[all factors relevant to the best interests of the corporation and
shareholders], as well as factors designated in § 6.02(b)(2) [other
interests or groups with respect to which the corporation has a
legitimate concern].3"
9 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1993).
395 See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2571-73 (1995).
39 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 6.02 cmt. a, at
411.
39 Id. reporter's note 5, at 431.
39 Id. cmt. c, at 411.3 99 Id.
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Thus, the fundamental difference between the enhanced
business judgment rule in Section 6.02 and the standard busi-
ness judgment rule of Section 4.01(c) can be articulated as
follows. Under the standard rule, disinterested directors acting
in good faith and on an informed basis must "rationally believe
that the business judgment is in the best interests of the corpo-
ration."4 °' On the other hand, under Section 6.02, the action
taken must be reasonable in response to the offer and in the
best interests not just of the corporation but also of sharehold-
ers. Also, the directors may take into consideration the impact
on other constituencies, so long as this does not significantly
disfavor the long term interests of shareholders.
The Project indicates that "[u]nder normal circumstances, the
best interests of the corporation and its shareholders will coin-
cide."401 As indicated, in liability actions against disinterested
directors the normal business judgment rule applies.0 2
E. General Scope of Defensive Actions
The Project indicates that Section 6.02 does not deter the
directors' ability to vigorously urge the shareholders to reject an
unsolicited offer and to expend corporate funds for this pur-
pose."3 Also, directors may, on advice of counsel that there
are substantial grounds, initiate litigation.4"
Section 6.02 does not impose on a target's directors the duty
to conduct an auction, 40 and this provision permits a target's
directors to take both pre-planning actions in response to possi-
ble future tender offers, as was the case in Moran v. Household
International, Inc., °" with the issuance of a poison pill, and
current actions in response to an existing tender offer.40 7
4o0 Id. at § 4.01(c)(3).
401 Id. at cmt. c, 413.
402 Id. at 411 and § 6.02(d).
403 Id. cmt. c, at 414.
40 Id. at 415.
4- Id. at 420.
406 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985).




The directors may take action that gives the shareholders an
alternative to an unsolicited tender offer, provided such alterna-
tive does not preclude consideration by the shareholders of the
unsolicited offer."8  Thus, coercive alternatives "usually
[would] not satisfy Section 6.02."'09 In this regard the Project
says that a "premium self-tender for less than the number of
shares sought by the pending offer may have the same coercive
effect as a front-end loaded two-tier offer by a third-party bid-
der."41 Although such a coercive self-tender may be a reason-
able response to an offer, special scrutiny by the court would be
appropriate.
41'
The Project illustrates the types of self-tenders that are and
are not coercive. If a partial self-tender expires at the same
time as a third-party tender offer for all the shares and is at a
higher price, the self-tender may have the effect of coercing the
shareholders to tender into the self-tender even if they think
the third party offer is more favorable.4' On the other hand,
if the self-tender expires after the third-party offer so that the
shareholders may still tender into the third party offer, the
self-tender is not coercive. 41 3 If both the self-tender and the
third party offers are made for the same number of shares,
then the self-tender is not coercive.4 14
G. Reaction to Coercive Two-Tier Offers
Directors' action designed to protect shareholders from a
coercive two-tier tender offer by a third party would fall within
Section 6.02 and be subject to its standards. Such two-tier
offers may be structured to force shareholders to tender in





412 Id. iIlus. 1, at 415-16.
413 Id. illus. 2, at 416.
414 Id. illus. 3, at 416.
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first-step. This can be illustrated by the prisoner's dilemma
model. For example, assume that a third party's first-step offer
is at $100 per share for 50% of the target's stock and the sec-
ond-step merger is going to be at $50 per share for the balance
of the shares. Also, assume that if the tender offer is not con-
summated, the target's shares will have a value of $125 per
share. Assume that there are two shareholders of target, A and
B, each owning 50% of the shares. If neither tenders, both will
own shares with a value of $125 per share. If both tender, each
will receive cash of $75, $100 for half their shares and $50 for
the other half. If A tenders but B does not, A will receive $100
per share and B will receive only $50 per share. Under these
alternatives it can be expected that both A and B will tender in
order to avoid the worst result of receiving $50 per share, even
though they would both be better off by not tendering. 415 The
non-tendering option is not chosen because A and B cannot be
certain that the other will not tender and if one tenders and
the other does not, the non-tendering shareholder ends up in
the worst situation.
H. Redemption of Poison Pills
The Project says that under Section 6.02 in the face of a
hostile offer a target's board will be required to redeem a
shareholders' rights plan, "unless the board reasonably conclud-
ed that continuance of the rights would be in the best interests
of the corporation and its shareholders." 4" And, the board
generally could not under Section 6.02 create a rights plan that
blocked all future unsolicited tender offers.417
The Reporter's Notes say that the Reporters believe that the
results in Interco,418  Pillsbury,419  Anderson, Clayton,420
415 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal
Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (1985).
416 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 6.02 cmt. c(10),
at 423.
417 Id.
411 City Capital Assoc. L.P. v. Interco, Inc. 551 A.2d 787 (Del. 1988), appeal
dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988).
419 Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. The Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. 1988).
4' AC Acquisition Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del.
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Polaroid,42 and Time-Warner422 are consistent with Section
6.02.4
Interco and Pillsbury show that in the absence of unusual
facts, at an appropriate time, directors have an obligation to
redeem a poison pill and allow the shareholders to consider a
tender offer. In Anderson, Clayton, the court enjoined a partial
self-tender that was in response to an adequately priced, non-
coercive third-party tender offer. In Polaroid the court refused
to enjoin a coercive management self-tender made in response
to a third-party tender offer in view of the difficulty in valuing
the target. Polaroid shows that even an adequately priced non-
coercive tender offer with a commitment to do the back-end at
the same price as the front-end can constitute a threat to the
business plans of the corporation.
I. Effect of the Time Decision and the "Just Say No" Defense
The Project follows the principles of Paramount Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Time, Inc.42 in providing that "Section 6.02 does
not require a corporation to abandon its existing business plans
simply because someone has made a tender offer for its
shares."42 Such business plans include acquisitions and dispo-
sitions of substantial businesses and raising capital by the
issuance of securities. 426 If the implementation of the business
plan would prevent the consummation of the offer, the directors
should be prepared to present evidence that the timing for
implementing the plan was independently determined.4 27 The
Project illustrates this point in an example in which a target
that has been negotiating to sell a subsidiary receives a tender
1986).
421 Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278 (Del. 1989).
4 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.
1990).
423 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 6.02 reporter's
note 4, at 430.
424 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).




42 Id. at 417.
No. 2:145] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
offer conditioned on the abandonment of the sale. Assuming the
target's directors decide that the sale of the subsidiary is in the
best interest of the corporation and shareholders, they may
proceed with the sale.4'
Another illustration follows the facts in the Time case. In
this example corporations A (Time) and B (Warner) negotiate a
transaction in which Warner will merge into Time. Prior to
completion of the merger, corporation C (Paramount) makes a
tender offer for Time at an 80% premium, conditioned upon
termination of the merger. Time's directors, after analysis, de-
termine that it is in the best interest of Time and its share-
holders for Time to combine with Warner. As a result, Time
commences a tender offer for 100% of Warner's stock. No other
action is taken to block Paramount's tender offer. Paramount
sues to enjoin Time's tender offer. The example holds that
Time's offer can proceed, unless Paramount can establish that
Time's director's action "was not a reasonable response to the
offer" 429 and that a mere showing of the premium offered to
Time's shareholders is "not alone sufficient to satisfy ...
[Paramount's] burden of proof under § 6.02."' °
Section 6.02 allows the directors to take action to prevent the
consummation of a tender offer that would cause substantial
harm to the corporation, such as an offer that would result in
the assumption by the target of a large indebtedness that
would threaten the corporation's essential economic pros-
pects. 4 ' An expected post-tender offer sale by the acquiror of
a substantial portion of the target's businesses would not neces-
sarily be a threat to the corporation's essential economic pros-
pects.1 2 Also, the directors may consider whether the incur-
rence of indebtedness for the purpose of making payments to
shareholders will be considered a fraudulent conveyance that
might subject the shareholders to liability in the event of an
insolvency proceeding. 3
428 Id. illus. 4, at 417.
Id. illus. 5, at 418.
43 Id. at 418.
431 Id. cmt. c(7), at 419.
432 
Id.
43 Id. at 418 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp.,
803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert denied sub nom. McClellan Realty Co. v.
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The Project indicates that the target's directors have wide
latitude in responding to a tender offer:
Under some circumstances, such as where a tender offer is for
less than all of the shares, or where the corporation is seeking to
increase the offer to one that the board of directors has a reason-
able basis for concluding is adequate, or to develop other alterna-
tive actions, such as a restructuring that the directors view as in
the long-term interests of shareholders, . . . the directors should
be able under § 6.02 to take action to block a tender offer.'
For example, Section 6.02 does not require the target's direc-
tors to auction the target; the directors can make their judg-
ment as to the best offer. Further, the directors may accept a
lower offer that affords greater protection to employees or other
groups "so long as the offer accepted is not significantly lower
than the higher competing offer."" Also, the directors can act
to block a tender offer if they have information concerning the
target's value that cannot be disclosed without seriously injur-
ing the corporation. 6 In such a case, "a court would be ex-
pected to give close scrutiny to the reasonableness of the direc-
tors' conclusion that disclosure would result in a competitive
disadvantage."" Also, directors may cause the corporation to
enter employment agreements with key employees, even during
the pendency of an unsolicited tender offer, and to provide gen-
erous severance arrangements in such agreements."8
On the other side of the ledger, the Project says: "On the
other hand, there will be some sets of facts where the board
will not be able to block the tender offer and satisfy the re-
quirements of § 6.02."43 Thus, the reasonable response stan-
dard in Section 6.02(a) coupled with the imposition in Section
6.02(c) of the burden of proof on the challenging party will have
United States, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987)).
4 Id cmt. c(8), at 420.435 Id.
4-' Id. at 421.
43 Id.
4-' Id. cmt. c(10), at 424.
49 Id. cmt. c(8), at 420.
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the effect of protecting most blocking actions taken by the tar-
get's directors.
J. Application of the Delaware and ALI Defensive Tactics
Rules to the Time-Warner Transaction
1. Description of Paramount's Tender Offer for Time and
Time's Responsive Tender Offer for Warner
After the announcement of the originally proposed merger
between Time and Warner, Paramount made a cash tender
offer for Time. Paramount initially offered $175 in cash per
share and then raised the price to $200.440 Before the first
offer, Time's shares were trading for $126. (On November 30,
1994 Time's shares traded for under $34 per share.).
Time responded by terminating its merger agreement with
Warner and entering into an agreement with Warner pursuant
to which Time would make a tender offer at $70 per share for
Warner that would be followed up with a freezeout merger for
the balance of the Warner shares.
The two tender offers are diagrammed on the following page:
" Paramount Communications, Inc., Offer to Purchase Common Stock of
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2. Standards Governing Actions by Boards of Directors
a. Paramount's Board
Under Delaware law, the actions taken by Paramount's board
of directors were governed by the Delaware business judgment
rule. There appears to be no reported case in Delaware in
which the directors of a corporation making a tender offer were
denied protection under the business judgment rule.
Under the ALI rules, the duty of care of Section 4.01(a) and
the business judgment rule of Section 4.01(c) would have been
applicable to Paramount's board of directors. The directors
appear to have clearly satisfied the conditions of the business
judgment rule.
b. Time's Board
Under Delaware law, the first question to be addressed is
whether the Revlon duty to auction applied to Time. The Dela-
ware Supreme Court held, in Paramount Communications, Inc.
v. Time, Inc., ' that Revlon was not implicated because there
was no change of control of Time. The court found no change of
control even though in the originally proposed merger, the
Warner shareholders would have ended up owning 62% of the
stock of Time. This holding is consistent with the rejection of
the de facto merger doctrine in Delaware.
The court went on to hold, however, that since the tender
offer for Warner was a device for blocking Paramount's tender
offer for Time, the Unocal enhanced business judgment test
applied. Under this test the Time directors had to establish
that they had reasonable grounds for believing there was- a
danger to corporate policy and effectiveness and that their
defensive tactics were reasonable in relation to the threat
posed.
The court in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.
found that the Time's directors satisfied the Unocal enhanced
business judgment test. Presumably the above conclusions are
"' Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.
1990)
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not disturbed by the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in
QVC Network Inc. v. Paramount Communications, Inc."2 In
that case the court held that when a publicly held corporation
(i.e., Paramount) is being acquired by a single controlling share-
holder (i.e., Sumner Redstone), the directors of the target have
a duty under Revlon to get the "best value reasonably avail-
able.' This conclusion is butressed by the Delaware
Supreme Court's decision in Arnold v. Society for Savings
Bancorp, Inc.,' where the court said that Revlon duties ap-
ply:
At least in the following three scenarios: (1) when a corporation
initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to
effect a business reorganization involving a clear break-up of the
company, [citing Paramount v. Time]; (2) where in response to a
bidder's offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks
an alternative transaction involving the break-up of the company,
(id.]; or (3) when approval of a transaction results in a sale or
change of control, [citing QVC.]"
Under the ALI rules, Section 6.02 would have applied to
Time's tender offer for Warner, because the tender offer had
the foreseeable effect of blocking Paramount's tender offer.
Section 6.02 provides that a target's directors may take action
that has a foreseeable effect of blocking an unsolicited tender
offer if the action is a reasonable response. In making this
determination consideration is given to whether the corpor-
ation's essential economic prospects are threatened and may be
given to the impact on constituencies other than the target's
shareholders as long as the shareholders are not significantly
disfavored. Under Section 6.02(c), the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff; therefore, the Project differs radically in this regard
from Delaware law.
442 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
4 Id. at 43.
4" Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc., 650 A-2d 1270 (Del. 1994).
45Id at 1289.
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Under Section 6.02(d), if the business judgment rule of Sec-
tion 4.01(c) is satisfied, then the target's directors have no
personal liability.'
The Project indicates that the application of Section 6.02 to
the Time tender offer for Warner would have resulted in the
same conclusions reached as in Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. Time, Inc. 7
The Project does not adopt the Revlon duty to auction con-
cept.
c. Warner's Board
Warner was the target of Time's tender offer, but Warner
was not subject to an unwanted tender offer. Consequently, the
Unocal enhanced business judgment rule did not apply to
Warner and, therefore, the basic business judgment rule was
applicable.
Also, the Revlon auction rule did not apply to Warner; how-
ever, if another bidder for Warner had surfaced, Warner, as a
company undergoing a change of control resulting from the
tender offer, would have been subject to Revlon auction duties.
Under the ALI rules, Warner was not taking any action that
had the foreseeable effect of blocking an unsolicited tender offer
and, therefore, Section 6.02 would not have been implicated.
Consequently, Warner's board would have been subject to the
business judgment rule of Section 4.01(c). The Revlon duty is
not adopted by the Project.
3. Shareholders Voting
The shareholders of Paramount, Time and Warner did not
have the right to vote under Delaware Law and would not have
such rights under the ALI Project.
4 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJEcT, supra note 1, § 6.02 cmt. d, at
424.
447 Id. cmt. c(6), illus. 5, at 417-18 and reporter's note 3, at 430.
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4. Appraisal Rights in Paramount's Tender Offer for Time
and in Time's Tender Offer for Warner
a. Time's and Paramount's Shareholders as Acquiror
Shareholders
Delaware law does not give appraisal rights to the sharehold-
ers of the acquiror in a tender offer, and therefore; no appraisal
rights arose in Paramount's tender offer for Time or in Time's
tender offer for Warner. This denial of appraisal rights applies
in both cash tender offers and in exchange offers in which the
acquiror issues its stock in exchange for stock of the target
pursuant to a tender offer.
If the acquiror does not have a sufficient number of autho-
rized, but unissued, shares to issue shares in an exchange offer,
the shareholders of the acquiror would have to vote to increase
the number of authorized shares, but no appraisal rights would
arise.
The ALl rules generally do not provide for appraisal rights
in a tender offer, and this general rule governs both
Paramount's cash tender offer for Time and Time's cash tender
offer for Warner.
Under Section 7.21(a), appraisal rights would, however, apply
to an acquiror in an exchange offer that issued more than 40%
of its stock in exchange for stock of the target. In such case,
the 60% continuity requirement of Section 7.21(a) would not be
satisfied. The Project explains this rule as follows:
[Ain exchange offer in which the tendering company issues more
than 40% of its own voting stock to new holders would trigger
appraisal rights for the tendering corporation's shareholders, but
not for those of the target, because in the latter case there has
been no "exchange by the corporation of its stock" under
§ 7.21(a).48
4482 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANcE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 7.21 cmt. c(1),
at 304.
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b. Warner's Shareholders
Delaware law does not give appraisal rights to the sharehold-
ers of the target of a tender offer.
The ALI rules do not give appraisal rights to the sharehold-
ers of a target of a tender offer. The Project rejected a proposal
to provide appraisal rights for a target's shareholders in a ten-
der offer that resulted in the target no longer (a) being a listed
company, or (b) having 300 shareholders." 9
K. Observations
The bottom line is that Section 6.02 gives the target's direc-
tors wide discretion in defending against a hostile tender offer.
It would appear that a target's directors would lose the protec-
tion of Section 6.02 only in an egregious circumstance.
The Project says that "there will be some sets of facts where
the board will not be able to block [a] tender offer and satisfy
the requirement of § 6.02."450 Unfortunately, the Project does
not give an illustration of such a set of facts.
In its recent decision in American General Corp. v. Unitrin,
Inc.," I the Delaware Chancery court found that there was a
reasonable probability that a target's board violated its Unocal
duties in implementing a stock repurchase program but that
the board satisfied those duties in implementing a poison pill in
response to the acquiror's offer. The court reasoned that
"Unitrin's board believed in good faith that the offer was inade-
quate, and employed a poison pill to protect its shareholders
from a 'low ball' bid."452 On the other hand, the court found
that the repurchase program was "designed to keep the decision
to combine with American General within the control of the
members of the board [and, therefore,] fails to meet the propor-
tionality requirement of the Unocal test."4" The court's deci-
49 Id. reporters note 3, at 312-13.
45o 1 ALI CoRI'oRATE GOVERNANcE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 6.02 cmt. c(8),
at 420.
45 1994 WL 698483 (Del. CL 1994).
452 Id. at *8.
453 id
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sion in Unitrin appears to be soundly reasoned. It would ap-
pear that the same result would be reached under Section 6.02.
VI. SALE BY CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS OF
STOCK OF TARGET TO THIRD PARTY
A. The Rules
Section 5.16 addresses the sale by a target's controlling
shareholder of its controlling stock interest to a third party,
with the target's other shareholders not participating in the
sale. This transaction is the opposite of a freezeout. Rather
than purchasing the shares of the minority shareholders, the
controlling shareholder sells his own shares.
Under Section 5.16 the controlling shareholder has, subject to
the caveats noted below, the same right to dispose of its shares
as any other shareholder and may dispose of its shares for "a
price that is not made proportionately available to other share-
holders . . . ."" Thus, the controlling shareholder has the
right to a control premium on the sale of its shares. Under
Section 5.16, this right of disposition violates the duty of fair
dealing to the other shareholders if either
(a) The controlling shareholder does not make disclosure con-
cerning the transaction [§ 1.14(b)] to other shareholders with
whom the controlling shareholder deals in connection with the
transaction; or
(b) It is apparent from the circumstances that the purchaser is
likely to violate the duty of fair dealing... in such a way as to
obtain a significant financial benefit for the purchaser or an
associate [§ 1.O3]."
The Project explains that the disclosure exception in Section
5.16(a) is directed at selling controlling shareholders who help
persuade minority shareholders to sell at a lower price than
that at which the controlling shareholder sells.456 The duty of
1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJEcT, supra note 1, § 5.16.
4
5 1 Id.
' Id. § 5.16 cmt. d, at 376.
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disclosure only extends to shareholders with whom the control-
ling shareholder deals, and therefore, "Section 5.16(a) is . . .
consistent with the announced rule in Brown v. Halbert, 271
Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781(1969), although it does not
follow dicta in that opinion more broadly supportive of an equal
opportunity approach." 7 Section 5.16(a) does not prevent a
controlling shareholder who rejects an offer to buy all the cor-
poration's outstanding shares at one price from then offering its
own shares at a higher price."
The exception in Section 5.16(b) relating to likelihood of a
violation of the duty of fair dealing is consistent with such
cases as Clagett v. Hutchinson 9 and Swinney v. Keebler
Co."0 which hold generally that a controlling shareholder can-
not sell to a known looter.461 This exception applies because
the selling controlling shareholder is in the "best position both
to evaluate the risk and to prevent the transfer."
462
The Project points out, however, that the controlling share-
holder is not required to make an affirmative investigation "in
the absence of facts that would alert a reasonable person to the
need for further inquiry." Such inquiry is not required
merely because the purchaser has a "general reputation for
aggressive acquisitions."4  Rather, inquiry is necessitated by
facts sufficient to put the controlling shareholder "on notice
that it would be imprudent to proceed with the transaction
without making further inquiry as to the purchaser and its
motives for acquiring control of the corporation."46 The bur-
den of proof is on the challenging party.466
The Project explains that Section 5.16 follows the case law in
generally rejecting an equal opportunity rule that would require
457 Id.
45 id.
9 583 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir. 1978).
46 480 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973).








the controlling shareholder to share the control premium. 47
The Project says that Section 5.16 is not inconsistent with con-
trol share statutes4 68 which require the approval of disinter-
ested shareholders before control shares may be voted." 9
The Project gives three possible explanations of a control
premium: (1) the opportunity to exploit minority shareholders,
(2) the differential in value between controlling and minority
shares, and (3) efficiency gains resulting from the transfer of
control.470 The Project points out that there is empirical evi-
dence that at least in publicly held firms control premiums are
not paid for the purpose of exploiting minority shareholders,
and in any event, the fair dealing rules of the Project are de-
signed to prevent any such exploitation.4 7' Although the min-
ority shareholders may not share in a control premium, assum-
ing fair dealing, they will participate in any efficiency gains
realized as a result of the change in control.4 72
The Project says that although "controlling shareholders often
insist that any offer to acquire their shares be made available
on the same terms to other shareholders, . . . failure of the
controlling shareholder to seek equal treatment for other share-
holders will not expose the controlling shareholder to liability
* . .," absent non-disclosure or a knowing sale to a looter.473
Section 5.16 permits a transfer of control of a board of direc-
tors incident to a sale of a controlling stock interest. However,
a "bare sale of office unaccompanied by a sale of controlling
stock" is not permissible.474 Consequently, a transfer of the
board is not permitted if a non-controlling shareholder who
controls the board transfers control of the board in connection
467 Id. cmt. c, at 374 (citing, inter alia, Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 397
N.E.2d 387 (N.Y. 1979) and Clagget v. Hutchinson, 583 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir.
1978)).
4 See, e.g., INDIANA CODE § 23-1-17-1 to 23-1-54-3 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
469 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 5.16 cmt. c, at
374.
470 Id. at 374-75.
471 Id. at 375.
472 Id.
473 Id.
414 Id. cmt. f, at 379.
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with a sale of stock at a premium.475 The transfer of control
could be effectuated by the serial resignations of the old direc-
tors and the simultaneous appointment of the purchaser's nomi-
nees. In these types of sales of office, upon suit by a sharehold-
er, the appointment of the purchaser's nominees is voidable and
the selling shareholder must account for the premium. This
principle is consistent with such cases as Essex Universal Corp.
v. Yates476 and In re Caplans' Petition.47
B. Application of the Delaware and ALI Sale of Controlling
Shares Rules to the Time-Warner Transaction
1. How a Hypothetical Sale of Controlling Shares Could Have
Been Implicated
As a predicate to Time's tender offer for Warner, Time could
have purchased shares of Warner from a controlling sharehold-
er of Warner (it is assumed that such a shareholder existed
only for purposes of this analysis) at a price above the price
Time paid in the subsequent tender offer for the balance of
Warner's stock. Such a transaction is not prohibited by the
Williams Act amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (Sections 13(d) and (e), and 14(d) and (e)) as long as the
purchase of controlling shares is made prior to the commence-
ment of the tender offer.
2. Treatment of a Hypothetical Sale of Controlling Shares of
Warner to Time Prior to Tender Offer
Delaware law presumably follows the general rule which
permits "controlling shareholders to sell their shares at a pre-
mium above the market price existing prior to disclosure of the
transaction without ... requir[ing] either that the premium be
shared with other shareholders or that the transaction be re-
structured so that all shareholders [can] participate on the
same terms."478 Thus, a sale of controlling shares in the cir-
475 Id.
476 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
47 198 N.E.2d 908 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964).
478 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 5.16 cmt. c, at
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cumstances described above probably would have been permit-
ted under Delaware law. 9
Under ALI Section 5.16, a controlling shareholder, as defined
in Section 1.10, can sell his shares at a premium above that
offered to the other shareholders as long as such shareholder
makes a disclosure to other shareholders with whom he deals
and it is not apparent that the purchaser is likely to violate
the duty of fair dealing. Thus, the type of sale of a controlling
interest described above likely would have been permitted un-
der the ALI rules.
C. Observations
Section 5.16 correctly rejects the equal opportunity doctrine,
and it correctly adopts the principle that a selling controlling
shareholder cannot sell to a known looter. Both of these princi-
ples are consistent with the developing case law in this area,
and there are no compelling reasons to move in a different
direction.
Although an inquiry concerning the purchaser is not re-
quired, it would be prudent for a selling controlling shareholder
to refuse to sell unless, on the basis of a due diligence investi-
gation, it concludes that there is no reason to believe the pur-
chaser will violate its duties of fair dealing.
VII. NON-MAJORITY CONTROL AND
MAJORrry CONTROL FREEZEOUTS
A. Introduction
Freezeouts or squeezeouts involve situations in which a
shareholder, usually a parent corporation, that owns a control-
ling stock interest in a subsidiary corporation (target) acquires
all of the stock or assets of the target in a merger, liquidation
or sale of assets transaction. The transaction can take many
forms, including a merger of the target with a wholly-owned
374.
4" See Rabkin v. Olin Corp., 1990 WL 47648 (Del. Ch. 1990).
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subsidiary of the parent. After the dust settles, the controlling
parent holds either directly or indirectly all of the target's stock
or assets, and the target's minority shareholders have been
cashed out or have received securities in the parent.
The Project divides freezeout transactions into two broad
categories: First, transactions in which the controlling share-
holder is not the majority shareholder of the target (i.e., non-
majority control freezeouts), and second, transactions in which
the controlling shareholder is the majority shareholder of the
target and, therefore, can unilaterally effectuate the freezeout
transaction without the vote of the minority shareholders (i.e.,
majority control freezeouts). This latter category includes situa-
tions in which a controlling corporate shareholder owns a suffi-
cient stock interest in the target to effectuate a short-form
merger (usually 90% or 95%).
Both of these transactions raise issues under the "duty of
loyalty" which requires that directors, senior executives and
controlling shareholders provide their "undivided and unselfish
loyalty to the corporation . . . ."o The Project refers to this
duty of loyalty as a duty of fair dealing and provides in Section
5.01: "Directors [§ 1.13], senior executives [§ 1.33], and control-
ling shareholders [§ 1.10], when interested [§ 1.23] in a matter
affecting the corporation, are under a duty of fair deal-
ing...
Generally this duty of fair dealing is satisfied under Section
5.02 if the conflict of interest is disclosed and the transaction is
either fair to the corporation when entered into or approved by
disinterested directors or disinterested shareholders.
Non-majority control freezeouts, which are addressed in Sec-
tion VII.B.4 below, are subject to the fair dealing standards in
Section 5.10, and the appraisal remedy is not exclusive.
482
The majority control freezeout is also subject to the fair dealing
standards of Section 5.10; however, appraisal is the exclusive
remedy if the conditions in Section 7.25 are satisfied.4' Non-
4 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANcE PROJEcT, supra note 1, § 5.01 reporter's
note 1, at 206 (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)).
481 Id. § 5.01.
48 Id. § 5.15 cmt. c, at 365. See also id. § 3.74 cmt. c, at 351 and § 7.25
cmt. c, at 384. See infra Part VII.B.4.
48 2 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANcE PROJEcT, supra note 1, § 7.24 cmt. c, at
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majority control freezeouts are addressed in Section VIB, and
majority control freezeouts are taken up in Section VII.C.
If the controlling shareholder disposes of its interest in the
target and has no interest in the acquiring corporation, then
the fair dealing principles are not implicated. This is so even if
the controlling shareholder receives a control premium, unless,
as provided in Section 5.16' no disclosure is made or the
sale is to a person who is likely to violate the duty of fair deal-
ing. If the disposition by the controlling shareholder is made in
a transaction in which the appraisal remedy is provided, then
under Section 7.24 appraisal is the exclusive remedy. If the
controlling person has an interest in the acquiring entity that
causes such controlling person to be interested in the transac-
tion, within the meaning of Section 1.23 of the Project, then the
transaction is subject to the management buyout rules of Sec-
tion 5.15.
B. Non-Majority Control Freezeouts
1. Introduction
Non-majority control freezeouts are subject to the fair dealing
standards of Section 5.10. It should first be pointed out, howev-
er, that if a parent owns less than a majority of the stock of a
subsidiary, the presence of disinterested directors on the subsid-
iary's board "may lead [a] court to conclude that [the subsid-
iary] is not controlled ..... "' In this situation the fair deal-
ing standards of Section 5.10 are not applicable.8
Under Section 5.10(a), the controlling shareholder fulfills its
duty of fair dealing in one of two ways. First, under Section
5.10(a)(1), the duty is satisfied if the transaction is fair to the
corporation when entered into. Second, under Section 5.10(a)(2),
the duty is satisfied if the following two conditions are met.
First, the transaction is authorized or ratified by disinterested
351 and § 7.25 cmt. c, at 384. See infra Part VII.C.2.c.
4"'See infra Part VI.
485 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 5.10 cmt. e, at
330.
4W id.
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shareholders following disclosure concerning the conflict of in-
terest and the transaction. Second, the transaction does not
constitute a waste of corporate assets at the time of sharehold-
er action. Thus, the duty of fair dealing is satisfied by either a
fairness standard or a waste standard.
Under Section 5.10(b), which applies to non-ordinary course
transactions, if after disclosure, the transaction is authorized in
advance by disinterested directors or authorized or ratified by
disinterested shareholders, the challenging party has the bur-
den of proof. Thus, if the conditions of Section 5.10(a)(2) are
satisfied, the challenging party must prove that the transaction
amounts to a waste of corporate assets, not that the transaction
was merely unfair. The challenging party also has the burden if
the transaction was ratified by disinterested directors and the
failure to get their prior approval "did not adversely affect the
interests of the corporation in a significant way."187 The con-
trolling shareholder has the burden of proof if the transaction
was not so authorized or ratified.4'
Thus, in a non-majority control freezeout, the controlling
parent has three practical avenues. First, complete the transac-
tion without getting prior approval of disinterested directors or
disinterested shareholders, in which case the controlling parent
has the burden of proving that the transaction is fair."9 Sec-
ond, make full disclosures concerning the conflict of interest
and the transaction and obtain the prior approval of disinter-
ested shareholders (whether or not prior approval is received
from disinterested directors), in which case the challenging
party has the burden of proving that there was a waste of
corporate assets.49 Third, make full disclosure of the conflict
of interest and the transaction, obtain the approval of disinter-
ested directors (but not the approval of disinterested sharehold-
ers), in which case the challenging party has the burden of
proving that the transaction is unfair.49' These rules can be
diagrammed as follows:
487 Id. at § 5.10(b).
48' Id. at § 5.10(b) and (c).
489 Id. at § 5.10(a)(1).
490 Id. at § 5.10(a)(2) and (b).
491 Id. at § 5.10(a)(1), (a)(2) and (b).
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2. No Disclosure Needed Before Transaction Subject to
Fairness Standard
The Project says that although in the
usual course of dealing between a controlling shareholder and the
corporation, the controlling shareholder is not required to under-
take the disclosure of material facts with respect to the conflict
of interest and the transaction . . ., [a]s a matter of corporate
practice ... a controlling shareholder should make disclosure
when dealing with the board of the [controlled] corporation."492
As a practical matter in a non-majority control freezeout,
disclosure will have to be made in order to obtain a sufficient
vote of the shareholders, even though the transaction is not
approved by disinterested shareholders. Even if a vote of share-
holders is not required, Section 14(c) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 would likely require full disclosure.
3. Proof of Fairness
Under Section 5.10(a), the transaction must be fair, unless
full disclosure is made and the approval of disinterested share-
holders is obtained.493 The controlling parent corporation has
the burden of proving fairness, unless full disclosure is made
and the approval of disinterested directors (but not of disinter-
ested shareholders) is obtained, in which case the burden of
proof is on the challenging party.494 Fairness is established if
it is shown that the transaction falls within a range of reason-
ableness.
4 95
The Project says that if the controlling parent has attempted
to "approximate an arm's length transaction by providing inde-
pendent representation of the controlled corporation in the
49 Id. § 5.10 cmt. d, at 327.
49 See Table 1.
414 See id.
45 1 ALI CoRPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 5.10 cmt. e, at
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negotiations[,]... court[s] should give substantial weight to the
judgment of disinterested directors of the controlled corpora-
tion ... ."9" In support of this proposition the Project refers
to the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc.497 That case involved the acquisition by a control-
ling parent (Signal) of all of the stock of its partially owned
subsidiary (UOP) in a freezeout transaction. The Project says
that the following excerpt from the Weinberger opinion is of
particular relevance:
Although perfection is not possible, or expected, the result here
could have been entirely different if UOP [the subsidiary] had
appointed an independent negotiating committee of its outside
directors to deal with Signal [the controlling parent] at arm's
length .... [Flairness in this context can be equated to conduct
by a theoretical, wholly independent, board of directors ....
Particularly in a parent-subsidiary context, a showing that the
action taken was as though each of the contending parties had in
fact exerted its bargaining power against the other at arm's
length is strong evidence that the transaction meets the test of
fairness 9
The Project also says that a reviewing court should not give
weight to an independent negotiating committee if it fails to
provide effective representation or if the controlling shareholder
consummates the transaction over the objection of the indepen-
dent negotiating committee.4 99
The Project points out that although some cases recognize
the duty of a controlling parent corporation to act in the inter-
est of its shareholders, in the absence of total abstention by
the common directors, or independent representation of the
496 Id. at 328.
" Id. (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A-2d 701 (Del. 1983)).
498 I- (citing Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709 n.7).
49 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANcE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 5.10 cmt. e, at
328-29 (citing Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp., 498 A.2d 1099 (Del.
1985)).
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subsidiary by other directors, common directors must determine
what is best for both the parent and the subsidiary.""'
4. Appraisal Rights in Non-Majority Control Freezeouts
a. Availability of Appraisal Rights
Most non-majority control freezeouts will be effectuated by
merger, such as a reverse subsidiary merger, and consequently,
the shareholders of the target will have appraisal rights under
Section 7.21(a). Even if the freezeout is effectuated in another
form, such as by charter amendment or reverse stock split,
appraisal rights will arise under Section 7.21(b).
b. Determining Fair Value in a Non-Majority Control
Freezeout
(1) In General
A non-majority control freezeout is an interested transaction,
and the same standards that apply for determining fair value
in a management buyout also apply for determining fair value
in a non-majority control freezeout.50' Thus, under Section
7.22(c) in a non-majority control freezeout, the court "generally
should give substantial weight to the highest realistic price that
a willing, able, and fully informed buyer would pay for the
corporation as an entirety."5 0 2 This standard is discussed more
fully in Section IV.C.2.
(2) Determining Fair Value in Two-Tier Offers
A non-majority control freezeout may be the second step of a
two-tier tender offer. In two-tier tender offers, the front-end
price normally will constitute the floor in a valuation proceed-
' Id. at 330 (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del.
1983)).
"o See supra Part IV.C.2.
2 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRoJEcT, supra note 1, § 7.22(c).
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ing regarding the back-end," 3 absent material adverse chang-
es to the target or a general market decline.5 The Project
explains that this rule can help mitigate the effect of the pres-
sure to tender the target's shareholders experience in a two-tier
offer." 5 This rule should not apply, however, in a private sale
of control on the front-end.0 6 Also, in a two-tier "any and all"
tender offer with the same price on both ends that is sanc-
tioned by the target's board, there is little reason to permit a
"minority shareholder who holds out to obtain a higher price
than that received by the shareholders who tendered.""1 The
Project points out that these types of transactions are excepted
from the SEC's going private rules under Rule 13e-3(g). 08
The Project goes on to explain that in these "any and all"
offers, the fair price "presumption created by Section 7.22(b)
should apply, unless significant new factors not apparent at the
time of the first transaction would make the same price inequi-
table."509 As discussed more fully in Section VII.C.2.c. (4),
which deals with majority control freezeouts, in Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc.510 the Delaware appraisal court did not ac-
cept this fair price assumption and found that the appraised
price in the back-end freezeout was $21.60 per share even
though the front-end tender offer price was $23.
c. Non-Exclusivity of Appraisal Proceeding for
Non-Majority Control Freezeouts
Section 7.24, which sets out the general rules regarding the
exclusivity of appraisal proceedings, provides that exclusivity is
not available for a freezeout transaction under Section 5.10.
Also, Section 7.24 does not apply to a transaction under Section
m Id. § 7.22 cmt. f, at 328-29.
5w Id.
50 Id. at 328.




5 Id. at 329-30.
510 1990 WL 161084 (Del. Ch. 1990).
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7.25, which provides that appraisal is the exclusive remedy for
certain majority control freezeouts. Thus, appraisal is not the
exclusive remedy for (1) non-majority control freezeouts under
Section 5.10 and (2) majority control freezeouts under Section
5.10 that do not satisfy the conditions of Section 7.25.511
Consequently, in a non-majority control freezeout the chal-
lenging Party can challenge the transaction on the grounds of
either fairness or waste of corporate assets. The waste standard
applies if the controlling parent complies with Section 5.10(a)(2)
in making full disclosure and receiving approval of disinterested
shareholders. As indicated in the discussion of fairness in Sec-
tion VII.B.3, if the controlling parent utilizes an independent
negotiating structure in determining the freezeout price, courts
should give "substantial weight" to the judgment of disinterest-
ed directors concerning the fairness of the price. Consequently,
as a practical matter if such an independent structure is uti-
lized and the disinterested shareholders approve the transac-
tion, a dissenting shareholder would unlikely be successful in
establishing either a waste of corporate assets or an appraisal
fair value that exceeded the freezeout price.
It would appear that appraisal would only be an effective
remedy if the controlling parent unilaterally effectuated the
freezeout, in which case the parent would have the burden of
establishing fairness under Section 5.10(a)(1), and the freezeout
consideration would not be convincing evidence of fair value in
an appraisal proceeding. As a practical matter, if the parent
acts unilaterally, there probably will not be an appraisal pro-
ceeding because the fairness proceeding will likely be more
advantageous to shareholders, and all shareholders, not just
those who dissent, would participate.
5 See infra Part VII.C.2.c.
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C. Majority Control Freezeouts
1. Introduction
Majority control freezeouts (i.e., freezeouts where the parent
has sufficient votes to effectuate the transaction itself) are sub-
ject to the rules of Section 5.10, which also apply to non-majori-
ty control freezeouts, unless the transaction satisfies the re-
quirements of Section 7.25, which provides that appraisal is the
exclusive remedy. Consequently, in this type of transaction the
parent corporation has under Section 5.10(a)(1) the burden of
proving that the transaction is fair, unless full disclosure is
made and the transaction is approved by disinterested share-
holders, in which case under Section 5.10(a)(2) and (b) the
challenging party has the burden of proving a waste of corpo-
rate assets. If disclosure is made and the transaction is ap-
proved by disinterested directors, but not disinterested share-
holders, the challenging party has under Section 5.10(a)(1) and
(b) the burden of proving that the transaction was not fair.
512
Section 7.25 provides a mechanism for avoiding the above
rules and making appraisal the exclusive remedy for challeng-
ing a majority-control freezeout.513 Under Section 7.25(d), this
provision is only available to publicly held corporations. The
Reporter's Notes explain that freezeouts of closely-held corpora-
tions "have often been found wrongful by the courts absent a
strong justification."514
2. Appraisal Rights in Majority Control Freezeouts
a. Availability of Appraisal Rights
As in the case of non-majority control freezeouts, appraisal
rights will arise in majority control freezeouts under the merger
"1 See supra Table 1.
513 See infra Part VII.C.2.c.
514 2 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 7.25 reporter's
note 2, at 391 (citing Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1986)).
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rule of Section 7.21(a) or the general freezeout rule of Section
7.21(b).5 15 Appraisal rights would clearly arise in any short-
form merger, that is a merger which can be approved solely by
a parent corporation that owns at least 90 or 95% of the stock
of the merging subsidiary.
b. Determining Fair Value in a Majority Controlled
Freezeout
A majority controlled freezeout, like a non-majority control
freezeout, is an interested party transaction, and consequently,
the Section 7.22(c) "highest realistic price standard" that ap-
plies for minority control freezeouts also applies for majority
control freezeouts.5 16 Also, in two tier offers the same stan-
dards apply for determining fair value in non-majority and
majority control freezeouts.5 1
c. Exclusivity of Appraisal Proceedings for Certain
Majority Control Freezeouts
(1) In General
Section 7.25(a) provides that an appraisal proceeding is a
challenging party's exclusive remedy to a transaction in control
involving a corporate combination in which a controlling share-
holder is a party, if the controlling shareholder holds sufficient
voting shares of the target to approve the transaction and the
following four conditions are satisfied.
First, under Section 7.25 (a)(1), the target's directors (or the
parent's directors, if the target's directors are not required to
approve the transaction, such as with a short form merger)
must have an "adequate basis, grounded on substantial objec-
tive evidence, for believing that the consideration offered to the
minority shareholders in the transaction constitutes fair value
515 See supra Part VII.B.4.a.
516 See supra Part VII.B.4.b.
517 See supra Part VII.B.4.b.ii.
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for their shares .... 51 This requirement is explored in
greater detail below. Second, under Section 7.25(a)(2), disclosure
must be made to minority shareholders concerning the transac-
tion, the basis for the determination of fair value, the conflict of
interest and the availability of appraisal rights. Third, under
Section 7.25(a)(3), the transaction must comply with all applica-
ble laws and the target's charter documents. Fourth, under
Section 7.25(a)(4), the target's shareholders who do not vote to
approve the transaction must be entitled to an appraisal rem-
edy that is consistent with the principles embodied in Sections
7.22 and 7.23.
If the four conditions are not satisfied so that the transaction
falls outside of Section 7.25, then the transaction is subject to
Section 5.10, as discussed in Section VII.B.1 above, and ap-
praisal will not be the exclusive remedy.-' 9
Section 7.25 applies to all forms of majority controlled freeze-
out transactions, including transactions in which the minority
shareholders receive cash (i.e., cash outs) and those in which
the minority shareholders receive securities.52 ° It applies to
various types of mergers, including triangular mergers with
controlled subsidiaries of the controlling shareholder and short-
form mergers, that is mergers in which the target's sharehold-
ers do not have the right to vote.52'
The Project explains that there are three reasons for making
appraisal the exclusive remedy in these situations. First, the
freezeout is likely to promote efficiency by eliminating the need
to scrutinize intercorporate dealings between the parent and
the target.5" Second, the fair expectations of minority share-
holders probably are not violated.52 This was not the situa-
tion, however, in the New England Patriots case5" which is
618 2 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 7.25(a)(1).
519 Id. § 7.25 cmt. c, at 384-85.
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discussed in Section VII.C.3 below. Third, if the majority share-
holder is a corporation, a "freezeout at a fair price is supported
by analogy to the short-form merger statutes."5
The controlling shareholder must not just be the majority
shareholder, it must possess sufficient voting power under the
applicable state law and the corporate charter to unilaterally
effectuate the transaction.526
Under Section 7.25(b), the controlling shareholder has the
burden of proving compliance with the above four conditions,
unless after full disclosure, the transaction was approved in
advance by disinterested directors and either approved in ad-
vance or ratified by disinterested shareholders. Consequently,
the parent can place on the challenging party the burden of
proving non-compliance with the conditions for exclusivity by
setting up an independent negotiating structure and receiving
approval of the disinterested shareholders. This applies in both
long-form and short-form mergers.
Under Section 7.25(c), if (1) all of the conditions for exclusiv-
ity are present, except that there is no appraisal remedy for
dissenters, and (2) after disclosure, the transaction is approved
by disinterested shareholders, then the transaction may be
challenged on the grounds that it is not fair, and the challeng-
ing party has the burden of proof. In such situations, if the
approval of disinterested directors is not received, the parent
has the burden of proof that the transaction was fair. If disin-
terested director approval is received, following Weinberger,
courts should give substantial weight to their judgment.527
If the controlling shareholder does not have an equity inter-
est in the surviving entity and the transaction is not subject to
the management buyout provisions of Section 5.15, then the
fair dealing principles of Section 5.10 are not implicated and an
appraisal proceeding is the exclusive remedy under Section
7.24.
525 2 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJEcT, supra note 1, § 7.25 cmt. c, at
383.
52 Id. at 384.
r27 Id. at 387-88.
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(2) Reasonable Belief of Directors as to Fair Value
The first condition for exclusivity is that the directors who
propose the freezeout on behalf of the controlled corporation
have "an adequate basis, grounded on substantial objective
evidence, for believing that the consideration offered to the
minority shareholders in the transaction constitutes fair value
for their shares, as determined in accordance with the stan-
dards provided in § 7.22."528 Section 7.22(a) provides that fair
value is to be "determined [by] using the customary valuation
concepts and techniques generally employed in the relevant
securities and financial markets for similar businesses in the
context of the transaction giving rise to appraisal."529
The Project says that in determining whether a board's deter-
mination of the fair value of minority shares is "grounded on
substantial objective evidence," a court need not conduct a full
review of fair value as would occur in an appraisal proceed-
ing.53 0 Courts should focus on the following two inquiries:
(1) [W]hether, through procedures that would as a matter of
practice normally be employed in arm's-length transactions with
third parties, the corporate decision-maker [§ 1.11] has caused to
be developed, and independently evaluated, reliable evidence of
the fair value of its shares as determined in accordance with the
standards provided in § 7.22; and (2) whether this evidence is an
adequate basis for the determination that the consideration of-
fered to the minority shareholders in the transaction constitutes
fair value for their shares." 1
If an independent negotiating structure is not feasible in a
short-form merger, the absence of such a structure will not
prevent the parent from establishing objective evidence through
other means.532
12 Id. § 7.25(a)(1).
5- M § 7.22(a).
530 Id. § 7.25 cmt. c, at 385.
531 Id.
532 Id. at 385-86.
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The Project says, however, that the use of independent nego-
tiating committees should be encouraged in transactions subject
to Section 7.25 and that "a court reviewing the price to be paid
in an appraisal proceeding should be entitled to give consider-
able weight to a price arrived at through what approximates an
arm's-length negotiation ...... ' On the other hand, if an in-
dependent negotiating structure is not used, the "price that
would be offered by a third party to acquire the entire corpora-
tion would be persuasive evidence of fair value."5"
If a court concludes that this adequate basis standard is not




Under Section 7.25(a)(2), full disclosure to the minority
shareholders is required whether or not proxies are soli-
cited.5 36 Thus, Section 7.25(a)(2) is consistent with Section
14(c)537 and Regulation 14C53 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, which require the distribution of an information
statement to minority shareholders concerning a freezeout
transaction even if they do not have the right to vote on the
transaction. The Project indicates that such disclosure is re-
quired to allow the minority shareholders to determine whether
to exercise their appraisal rights." 9
The directors would have to disclose both that they are of
the view that the consideration offered to the minority share-
holders represents fair value for the shares and the basis for
that view.5" The Project indicates that this type of disclosure
is similar to that required by Item 8(a) of Schedule 13E-3,
'3 Id. at 388.
"" Id.
535 Id. at 386.50 id.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (1976).
m 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-1-7 (1995).




which applies in going private transactions. Item 8(a) requires
the controlling person to state whether the transaction is fair
or unfair and to discuss in "reasonable detail the material fac-
tors upon which the belief [concerning fairness] is based.""'
Disclosure is to be made concerning any independent negoti-
ating structure and the effectiveness of such structure in pro-
ducing a price based on arm's length negotiations.542
(4) Two Step Transactions
Section 7.25 does not prevent a majority shareholder from
purchasing in the open market shares held by minority share-
holders. Also Section 7.25 does not prevent an acquiring person
from becoming a controlling shareholder through "open market
purchases or a tender offer."' However, in the appraisal pro-
ceedings pursuant to a second step merger transaction, occur-
ring within a reasonable period of time after the initial pur-
chases, the price paid in the open market purchase or in the
first step stock purchase would be "presumed to be the best
evidence of the minimum fair value of the remaining shares,
absent a clear showing of an intervening change in the finan-
cial condition of the corporation or a general change in the
economy or in the industry in which the corporation operates
which affects share values."' The strength of the presump-
tion should diminish with time and the occurrence of economic
changes; however, to prevent the structuring of "disguised" two
step offers, the Project does not suggest any specific period of
time for linking the steps.-45
The Project says that in addition to promoting the proper
valuation in an appraisal proceeding, this concept of looking at
the price paid in the first step "serves to reduce any coercive
54' Schedule 13E-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1995).
642 2 ALI CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE PRoJEcT, supra note 1, § 7.25 cmt. c, at
386.
m Id. at 388.
"4 Id. at 389.
6z Id.
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effect of first-step offers on target shareholders by assuring
non-tendering shareholders of something approaching, but not
necessarily equaling, that price in a second-step freezeout."546
Thus, this valuation principle is designed to deter an acquiring
firm from balancing an overpayment in the first-step with an
underpayment in the second-step freezeout. 7
The Project may overestimate the anti-coercive effect of this
valuation principle because only dissenting shareholders would
get the benefit of the higher appraisal price. Those minority
shareholders who decide not to dissent must accept the price
offered, which could be much less than both the front-end price
and the appraisal price.
The position taken by the Project to the effect that the price
in the first step should generally be presumed to be the best
evidence of a fair price in an appraisal proceeding relating to
the second step was not followed in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc.' There, the Delaware appraisal court found that the
fair value of a target's shares in a second-step freezeout merger
was only $21.60 per share, even though the price paid in the
first-step tender offer, which occurred shortly before the freeze-
out, was $23 per share.
(5) Illustrations
The Project illustrates the principles under Section 7.25 by
reference to facts that are similar to those in Rabkin v. Philip
A. Hunt Chemical Corp., 9 which is discussed in the next
section. The basic facts indicate that the acquiring corporation
purchases 63% of the target's stock for $25 per share and
agrees in the purchase agreement that if the acquiring corpora-
tion acquires any of the target's minority shares within a year
it will pay at least $25 per share. Full disclosure of the terms
of the transaction is made to the target's minority shareholders.
After the lapse of the one year period, the acquiror proposes to
w Id.
547 Id.
w 1990 WL 161084 (Del. Ch. 1990)
54 498 A_2d 1099 (Del. 1985).
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acquire the minority shares which have been trading at $20 on
the open market. A committee of outside directors of the target
evaluates the offer and receives an opinion of an investment
banking firm to the effect that the remaining shares are worth
between $19 and $23 per share. The committee and the acquir-
ing corporation enter into a merger agreement calling for the
payment of $21 per share in cash to the minority shareholders.
The transaction is effectuated without the approval of the tar-
get's minority shareholders, but full disclosure is made as re-
quired by Section 7.25(a)(2). The merger agreement complies
fully with law and the target's shareholders are given an ap-
praisal remedy. The illustration holds that appraisal is the
exclusive remedy.5 '
In another example, the facts are the same as above, except
that at the time the acquiring corporation purchases 63% of
target's stock, it fully intended to wait a year and then acquire
the minority shares for $18 per share. The acquiring corpora-
tion considered the extra $7 per share paid for the 63% to be a
control premium. Presumably the independent negotiating
structure is adopted and the transaction is effectuated at $21
per share as indicated above. The illustration holds that al-
though appraisal is still the exclusive remedy for the minority
shareholders, they have a cause of action against the acquiring
corporation for failure to disclose its intention. The minority
shareholders may not, however, claim the control premium,
which is permitted under Section 5.16.55 '
3. Existing Law
The Project points out that several cases have limited the
power of a controlling shareholder to freezeout minority share-
holders, particularly in the absence of a business purpose.
5 2
5' 2 ALI CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 7.25 cmt. c,
illus. 1, at 389-90.
551 See supra Part VI.
552 2 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 7.25 cmt. a, at
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Although this approach had previously been taken in Delaware
in such cases as Singer v. Magnavox Co.,553 and Tanzer v. In-
ternational General Industries, Inc.," in Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc.,5" the Delaware Supreme Court abandoned the business
purpose requirement. Citing Rabkin v. Philip A Hunt Chemical
Corp.,"'6 the Project points out that the "standards in Dela-
ware as to the scope of judicial review of such transactions are
continuing to evolve."5 7
In Rabkin, the acquiring corporation, Olin, purchased 63.4%
of the stock of the target, Hunt Chemical for a price of $25 per
share. The stock purchase agreement provided that if Olin
purchased all or substantially all of the remaining Hunt shares
within one year from the date of the initial purchase, Olin
would have to pay the minority shareholders the same $25
price it paid initially. Approximately four weeks after the run-ning of the one year period, Olin's board approved a freezeout
transaction in which Hunt shareholders would receive $20 per
share. Two investment banking firms issued opinions that the
price was fair. Holding that under Weinberger appraisal was
the exclusive remedy, the Chancery Court rejected the claims of
minority shareholders that the price offered was grossly inade-
quate because Olin unfairly delayed the freezeout to avoid pay-
ing the higher price. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed
holding that the minority shareholders had alleged sufficient
facts to support a claim of unfair dealing and that this required
the Court of Chancery to closely focus upon Weinberger's man-
date of entire fairness based on a careful analysis of both the
fair price and fair dealing aspects of the transaction. 58 On
remand, Olin prevailed by convincing the court that the deci-
5 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
"' 379 A-2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
555 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
5' 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985).
r57 2 ALI CoRPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 7.25 cmt. a, at
382.
m Hunt Chemical, 498 A.2d at 1099.
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sion to do the freezeout was not made until after the one year
period had run.559
The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Kahn v. Lynch
Communications Systems, Inc.56 amplifies the application of
the Weinberger principle. In Kahn, the court said: "Once again,
this court holds that the exclusive standard of judicial review
in examining the propriety of an interested cash-out merger
transaction by a controlling or dominating shareholder is entire
fairness.... 561
The court then went on to say that although the controlling
shareholder initially has the burden of establishing entire fair-
ness,562 if the transaction is approved by an "independent
committee of directors or an -informed majority of minority
shareholders," the burden of proof on the fairness issue shifts to
the shareholder-plaintiff.5 6" In this case, the court found that
the "Court of Chancery's determination that the Independent
Committee 'appropriately simulated a third-party transaction,
where negotiations are conducted at arm's length and there is
no compulsion to reach an agreement,' is not supported by the
record."'5 6 Consequently, the controlling shareholder had the
burden of proof on the entire fairness question.
Some courts in other states continue to employ the business
purpose test, as reflected in Coggins v. New England Patriots
Football Club, Inc. 5 In the Patriots case, the court pointed
out that "[b]ecause the danger of abuse of fiduciary duty is
especially great in a freezeout merger, the court must be satis-
fied that the freezeout was for the advancement of a legitimate
corporate purpose. The court went on to say that the con-
trolling shareholder has the "burden of proving, first, that the
merger was for a legitimate corporate purpose and, second,
559 Rabkin v. Olin Corp., 1990 WL 47648 (Del. Ch. 1990).
6 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
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that, considering the totality of circumstances, it was fair to the
minority."
567
D. Application of the Delaware and ALI Freezeout Rules to
the Time-Warner Transaction
1. Description of the Freezeout Transaction
At this point, Time had completed its tender offer for
Warner, and Time owned 60% of the Warner shares. The
freezeout transaction was effectuated by a reverse subsidiary
merger pursuant to which a subsidiary of Time, Time-Sub,
merged into Warner. Pursuant to the freezeout merger the
common shareholders of Warner received in exchange for their
Warner shares a combination of Time cash pay preferred stock,
Time PIK (payment in kind) preferred stock, and BHC common
stock (i.e., common stock of a subsidiary of Time).5 6 The mer-
ger consideration was designed to have a value equal to the
$70 in cash per share paid in the tender offer. Upon completion
of the transaction, Time, which had its name changed to Time-
Warner, owned 100% of the common shares of Warner; the
common shareholders of Time continued to own their common;
and the minority common shareholders of Warner had their
shares converted into cash pay and PIK Time preferred plus
BHC common. The transaction can be diagrammed as follows:
6 Id. at 1119.
' Information Statement of Warner and Prospectus of Time Warner, Inc.
(Dec. 6, 1989).
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FREEZEOUT MERGER FOR WARNER
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2. Required Actions and Standards Governing the Actions of
the Boards of Directors
a. Time's Board
Time was not a constituent corporation under Section 251 of
the Delaware General Corporation Law. Therefore, Time's direc-
tors acted pursuant to their general supervisory authority un-
der Section 141.
Since Time was in control of Warner, it might appear that
the freezeout transaction would be governed by the intrinsic
fairness test set out in Weinberger.569 However, because the
directors of Warner approved the transaction, the intrinsic
fairness test in Delaware should not apply in this case, and
Time's directors should receive protection under the business
judgment rule.
Under Section 1.38 of the Project, the freezeout transaction
would not have been a transaction in control with respect to
Time, because there was no change in the ownership of Time's
common stock. Therefore, Section 6.01(a), which deals with
mergers, would not have been applicable to Time's board. Thus,
at first instance, the actions of Time's board would have been
governed by the duty of care standards in Section 4.01(a) and
the business judgment rule of 4.01(c).
Since Time was in control of Warner, Section 5.10 of the
Project would have applied and Time would have satisfied its
duty of fair dealing to Warner and its shareholders provided
either (1) the transaction was fair to Warner when entered
into, or (2) the transaction was authorized by disinterested
shareholders following disclosure concerning the conflict of in-
terest in the transaction and the transaction did not constitute
a waste of corporate assets. Thus, the fairness test would have
applied if disinterested shareholders had not approved the
transaction and a waste standard would have applied if disin-
terested shareholders had approved the transaction after full
disclosure.
"' Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
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Under Section 5.10(b), if the transaction is authorized in
advance by disinterested directors or disinterested shareholders
following disclosure, "the party challenging the transaction has
the burden of proof."70 In this transaction, the freezeout was
effectuated by Time voting its majority shares by consent rath-
er than having a shareholders' meeting and conditioning the
freezeout merger on the votes of disinterested shareholders.
Consequently, it would appear that the fairness test of Section
5.10(a) would have applied. However, since the tender offer and
freezeout were authorized in advance by the Warner directors,
who were disinterested directors, the burden of proof would
have been on the party challenging the transaction to prove
that the transaction was not fair.
As indicated in Section VII.C.2.c, under Section 7.25 of the
ALI rules, since this is a majority controlled freezeout, apprais-
al would have been the exclusive remedy, and consequently, the
fairness test of Section 5.10(a)(1) would not apply provided, (1)
the Time directors had "an adequate basis, grounded on sub-
stantial objective evidence, for believing that the consideration
offered . . . constitute[d] fair value,"57 ' (2) full disclosure con-
cerning the transaction and conflict of interest was made, (3)
the transaction was properly approved, and (4) the Warner
shareholders had the right to dissent. Since the Warner direc-
tors approved the transaction, Time's directors should have
satisfied the "adequate basis" condition and each of the other
conditions should have been satisfied; consequently, the transac-
tion should have come within Section 7.25.
b. Warner's Board
The business judgment rule applied to the decision of the
Warner board to support Time's tender offer for Warner and
the follow up freezeout merger. Since Warner was not the tar-
get of a competing offer, the Unocal enhanced business judg-
ment rule was not applicable. Also, since the freezeout was ap-
570 1 ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANcE PROJECT, supra note 1, § 5.10(b).
571 Id. § 5.10(a)(1).
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proved by the Warner board prior to the initiation of the tender
offer, the intrinsic fairness test of Weinberger was not appli-
cable.
Under the ALI rules, presumably the duty of care under
Section 4.01(a) and the business judgment rule under Section
4.01(c) would have applied to the decision of the Warner direc-
tors to support the tender offer and the follow-up freezeout
merger. This assumes that no directors or senior executive
officers had an interest, within the meaning of Section 1.23 of
the Project, in the transaction. If such an interest were present,
the transaction would be subject to the management buyout
rules of Section 5.15, and any such director or senior executive
officer would have to prove that the transaction was fair unless
the market test provisions of Section 5.15(b) had been satisfied.
The freezeout merger itself would have been a transaction in
control under Section 1.38, and, consequently, Warner's board
would have been subject to Section 6.01(a), which incorporates
the duty of care of Section 4.01(a), and the business judgment
rule of Section 4.01(c).
3. Right of Shareholders to Vote
a. Time's Shareholders
Because Time was not a constituent corporation under Sec-
tion 251 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, Time's
shareholders did not have a vote on the freezeout merger, un-
less a shareholder vote was needed to amend Time's charter to
authorize the issuance of the cash payout and PIK preferred.
Since in the freezeout merger Time did not issue at least
25% of its common stock (it issued none), the freezeout would
not have been a "transaction in control with respect to Time
under Section 1.38. Consequently, Time's shareholders would
not have had a right to vote under Section 6.01(b).
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b. Warner's Shareholders
Since Time owned more than 50% of the stock of Warner
after the tender offer, Time effectuated the merger by voting its
Warner shares pursuant to the consent provisions of Delaware
law, thereby effectively denying the minority shareholders a
vote on the transaction. Thus, no shareholder meeting was
required to complete the merger.
Pursuant to Section 14(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,572 Warner was obligated to distribute to its sharehold-
ers an information statement with respect to the freezeout
merger. The information statement was required to contain
information similar to that contained in a proxy statement
under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, and the freezeout
merger could not be implemented until 20 days after the date
of distribution. 3
Under the ALI rules, the freezeout merger would have been
a transaction in control for Warner under Section 1.38. Conse-
quently, the Warner shareholders would have had the right to
vote under Section 6.01(b) of the Project.
4. Appraisal Rights in the Second Step Freezeout Transaction
a. Time's Shareholders
Since the shareholders of Time did not have a vote on the
freezeout transaction, they did not have appraisal rights under
Delaware law.
Under the ALI rules, the shareholders of Time would not
have had appraisal rights because they satisfied the 40% conti-
nuity requirement of Section 7.21(a).
57 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c).
513 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a).
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b. Warner's Shareholders
Under Section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law,
the common shareholders of Warner did not have appraisal
rights in the second step freezeout merger because they re-
ceived publicly traded stock in the transaction.
In the second step freezeout merger, the shareholders of
Warner would have had appraisal rights under Section 7.21(a)
of the Project, which applies to mergers and also under Section
7.21(b), which applies to freezeouts.
5. Exclusivity of Appraisal Proceedings for Warner's
Shareholders in the Second Step Freezeout Transaction
As indicated in Section VII.D.4.b, in the second step freeze-
out transaction, the Warner common shareholders did not have
appraisal rights under Delaware law because of the publicly
traded shares exception in Section 262(b). Also, under the Dela-
ware Supreme Court's decision in Weinberger, appraisal was the
exclusive remedy in the absence of "fraud, misrepresentation,
self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or gross and
palpable overreaching . . . ."" Since the Warner directors
had approved the second step freezeout, the transaction would
appear to comply with the independent negotiating structure
suggested in Weinberger."5
'v Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983).
6' The Court said:
Although perfection is not possible, or expected, the result here could
have been entirely different if UOP had appointed an independent negoti-
ating committee of its outside directors to deal with Signal at arm's
length.... Since fairness in this context can be equated to conduct by a
theoretical, wholly independent, board of directors acting upon the matter
before them, it is unfortunate that this course apparently was neither
considered nor pursued.... Particularly in a parent-subsidiary context, a
showing that the action taken was as though each of the contending
parties had in fact exerted its bargaining power against the other at
arm's length is strong evidence that the transaction meets the test of
fairness.
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Presumably the "entire fairness" test of Weinberger did not
apply because the second step was approved as a result of
arm's length bargaining by the Warner directors who were not
interested in the transaction, acted in good faith, and were
informed." 6
As indicated above in Section VII.D.4.b, minority controlled
freezeout transactions under Section 5.10 of the Project and
majority controlled freezeouts under Section 7.25 of the Project
do not give rise to exclusive appraisal rights under Section
7.24. However, Section 7.25 provides for exclusivity of appraisal
rights in majority controlled freezeouts that satisfy the terms
and conditions of that provision.
Under Section 7.25, an appraisal proceeding is the exclusive
remedy for a majority controlled freezeout provided the follow-
ing conditions are satisfied:
(1) The directors who approved the transaction . . . have an
adequate basis, grounded on substantial objective evidence, for
believing that the consideration offered to the minority sharehold-
ers in the transaction constitutes fair value for their shares .. ;
(2) Disclosure concerning the transaction ... and [the direc-
tors beliefs with respect to value and the conflict of interest] is
made to the minority shareholders ... ;
(3) The transaction is [properly and legally] approved... ; and
(4) [The shareholders have a right to appraisal]."
Thus, if the above four elements are satisfied, appraisal is
the exclusive remedy. Also, the challenging party has the bur-
den of proving the failure to satisfy the above requirements.
In this situation, since Time owned approximately 60% of the
stock of Warner, the freezeout transaction was a majority con-
trolled freezeout and, therefore, would have been subject to the
Id. at 709-10 n.7.
" See, e.g., Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134 (Del. Ch.
1994).
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exclusivity rules of Section 7.25 of the Project, which appear to
have been satisfied.
6. Determining Fair Value of Shares in Appraisal Proceeding
in the Second Step Freezeout Transaction
As indicated above, under Delaware law appraisal is the
exclusive remedy in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation,
self dealing and the like, under the Weinberger standard. Also,
modern valuation techniques would be used in determining the
value of the dissenters' shares.
Fair value under the ALI rules would be determined under
Section 7.22(c). This provision provides that in any majority
controlled or minority controlled freezeout under Section 5.10 or
7.25 the "court generally should give substantial weight to the
highest realistic price that a willing, able and fully informed
buyer would pay for the corporation as an entirety.""8 This
provision also provides that in making this determination the
court may include "a proportionate share of any gain reason-
ably to be expected to result from the combination, unless spe-
cial circumstances would make such an allocation unreason-
able. 579
In the case of two-tiered tender offers, the Project says that
"[a]bsent material adverse changes to the corporation or a gen-
eral market decline, the front-end purchase price
would... normally constitute a floor."5 80 Thus, in the two
step tender offer where the second step follows the first step
shortly after completion of the first step, the price offered in
the first step should be determinative of the fair market value
of the shares in an appraisal proceeding resulting from the
second step freezeout.
In this case this would mean that the value of the Warner
shares cashed out in the freezeout merger would be no less
than the $70.00 purchase price paid by Time in the first step.
578 Id. § 7.22(c).
579 Id.
'8 Id. § 7.22 cmt. f, at 328-29.
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This floor rule does not apply, however, if the first step sale
was a private purchase of the controlled shares at a premium
in a transaction that would otherwise be covered by Section
5.16.81
If there is a two tier tender offer for 100% of the target
shares in an "any and all" tender offer, and the disinterested
directors of the target accept the tender offer price as fair, the
acceptance of the price by such directors should be seen as the
functional equivalent of its approval by an arm's length merger
with the same acquiror.582 Consequently, the tender offer
price paid by Time should be found to be the fair value of the
Warner shares in an appraisal proceeding relating to the
freezeout merger. This rule could force acquirors to pay the
same price in a second-step freezeout that they pay in the first-
step tender offer.
E. Observations
The exclusivity of the appraisal proceeding in Section 7.25
should be available in most majority-control freezeouts in which
the waste test of Section 5.10 otherwise would apply. As illus-
trated in Table 1, the waste standard applies and the burden is
on the challenging party if (1) full disclosure of the conflict of
interest and the transaction is made, and (2) disinterested
shareholders approve the transaction. There is no requirement
that disinterested directors approve the transaction.
Majority control freezeouts will be subject to the exclusivity
provisions of Section 7.25 if the following three basic conditions
are satisfied. First, the directors who approve the transaction
have "an adequate basis, grounded on substantial objective
evidence for believing that the consideration offered to the
minority shareholders in the transaction constitutes fair value
for their shares .... 83 Second, the transaction complies
51 Id. at 329.
5
82 Id.
5" Id. § 7.25(a)(1).
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with all the relevant legal requirements.5" Third, dissenting
shareholders have appraisal rights.5" The second and third
requirements will be satisfied in virtually every case, and if
disinterested directors are utilized, the first condition should be
satisfied. Thus, as a practical matter, in every majority con-
trolled freezeout in which the transaction is approved by both
disinterested directors and disinterested shareholders, appraisal
will be the exclusive remedy. Consequently, the transaction
cannot be challenged under even a waste standard. Further,
dissenting shareholders rarely would be successful in an ap-
praisal proceeding.
If the waste standard in Section 5.10 applies to a non-majori-
ty control freezeout, appraisal is not the exclusive remedy be-
cause Section 7.25 is not applicable. As a practical matter,
however, it would be highly unlikely that challenging share-
holders could establish that the transaction was a waste of
assets. And, where the waste standard applies, it would also be
unlikely that dissenting shareholders would be successful in an
appraisal proceeding.
On the other hand, evidence that a target's senior executives
received long-term compensation agreements from a successful
but low bidder but tilted a transaction to a low bidding white
knight with whom they had a prior relationship could consti-
tute "clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the
presumption [of fair value] created by Section 7.22(b)."586 Also,
the Project points out that this type of compensation package
could cause the senior executives to be deemed "interested" in
the transaction which would trigger scrutiny under the Section
5.15 management buyout provision.587
5" Id. § 7.25(a)(3).
l' Id. § 7.25(a)(4).
58 Id. § 7.22 cmt. c, illus. 2, at 318.




The ALI Corporate Governance Project provides suggested
governance rules for all forms of mergers and acquisitions,
including arm's length business combinations, management
buyouts, tender offers, sales of controlling stock interests, and
freezeouts. Each of these governance rules is illustrated in this
article by reference to the three-steps of the 1989 acquisition by
Time, Inc. of Warner Communications, Inc.
For arm's length mergers and acquisitions, the Project, in
essence, suggests the adoption of a de facto merger principle for
determining shareholders' voting and appraisal rights.58 Un-
der this principle, the shareholders of both the acquiring and
target corporations have the same rights to vote and dissent
without respect to the form of the transaction. Also, for arm's
length transactions, the Project suggests that the board of direc-
tors be subject to the standard business judgment rule.589
For management buyouts, the Project suggests that unless
the transaction is fully disclosed and market tested, the inter-
ested director/executive should have the burden of establishing
that the transaction is fair to the target's shareholders.590
The Project suggests that the defensive tactics taken by a
target's board be examined under a special reasonableness test,
with the burden of proof on the challenging party.59' This test
is similar to the enhanced business judgment rule under the
Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Unocal except the burden
is not on the target's directors.
The rules proposed by the Project for the sale of controlling
stock interests are substantially similar to the rules of current
law. Consequently, under the Project's rules, controlling share-
holders need not share a control premium with other sharehold-
See supra Part III.
s See supra Part Hl.
o See supra Part IV.
59 See supra Part V.
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ers; however, the controlling shareholder must take care not to
sell to a known looter.592
Finally, the Project suggests a different set of rules for
majority control and non-majority control freezeouts.593 Ap-
praisal is not the exclusive remedy for non-majority control
freezeouts, but is available for majority control freezeouts that
meet certain standards regarding disclosure and an indepen-
dent bargaining structure.
See supra Part VI.
"9 See supra Part VII.
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